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Foreword
This Report provides an important opportunity for the Government to consider 
how identities in the UK are changing and the possible implications for policy 
making over the next 10 years. For the first time, it brings together many areas 
of research into a single coherent narrative to analyse how drivers of change may 
affect identities in the UK in the future.
The findings are based on the most recent evidence from a wide range of 
authoritative sources. Over 100 academics and stakeholders have contributed 
to the development of this Report and the analysis is supported by 20 published 
evidence papers. I am particularly grateful to the lead expert group, chaired by 
Professor Chris Hankin, which has overseen the work.
Foresight has undertaken this research in response to growing evidence that the 
UK has undergone significant changes which affect how people see themselves and others. The economic 
downturn, the effects of globalisation, and increasing international migration have all been influential, while the 
impact of social media and modern communications technology have created a new ‘digital’ UK. In particular, 
the Report discusses an emerging trend towards ‘hyper-connectivity’, where mobile technology and the ubiquity 
of the internet enable people to be constantly connected across many different platforms. Hyper-connectivity 
is already removing any meaningful distinction between online and offline identities, while also blurring ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ identities. The trend could also act to increase the pace of change, leading to more dynamic and 
changeable identities and behaviours. 
This Report shows that ‘identity’ is not a simple notion. People can have many different overlapping identities 
which are fundamental to their individuality. Identities can exercise a powerful influence on the health and 
wellbeing of communities, and the degree to which they can build up social capital. There are important 
implications for a range of policy issues, such as the collection and use of data by government and the private 
sector, how individual rights and liberties can be balanced against privacy and security, and how inclusive 
identities can best be promoted. 
I am pleased to publish this Report, which I hope will contribute to the debate surrounding the complex field of 
identity, as well as providing practical advice to inform decision making in government. 
Professor Sir John Beddington CMG, FRS 
Chief Scientific Adviser to HM Government and  
Head of the Government Office for Science
This Report should be cited as:
Foresight Future Identities (2013)
Final Project Report.
The Government Office for Science, London.
 Contents
Executive Summary 1
1. Introduction 6
1.1 Aim 6
1.2 Who is the Report for? 6
1.3 How the Report is organised 7
2. What is identity and why does it matter? 9
2.1 Definition of an individual’s identity 9
2.2 Why do identities matter to policy makers? 11
3. Drivers of change 14
3.1 Social drivers 14
3.1.1 An ageing population 14
3.1.2 Young people 18
3.1.3 Religion and secularisation 19
3.1.4 Diversity 20
3.1.5 Hyper-connectivity 22
3.2 Technological drivers 25
3.2.1 Online identities 25
3.2.2 Social media 27
3.2.3 ‘Big data’ 28
3.2.4 Cybercrime 30
3.2.5 Biomedical technologies 32
3.3 Economic drivers 33
3.3.1 Consumerism 33
3.3.2 Economic downturn 34
3.4 Environmental drivers 37
3.4.1 Place attachment 37
3.4.2 The built environment 37
3.4.3 Environmental change and risk 38
3.5 Political drivers 41
3.5.1 Trust 41
3.5.2 ‘Britishness’ 43
4. Challenges and opportunities 48
4.1 Key themes of changing identities 48
4.1.1 Increasing hyper-connectivity 49
4.1.2 Increasing social plurality 50
4.1.3 Blurring of public and private identities 51
4.2 Implications for specific areas of policy 52
4.2.1 Social mobility 52
4.2.2 Social integration 53
4.2.3 Radicalisation and extremism 54
4.2.4 Health, environment and wellbeing 55
4.2.5 Skills, employment and education 56
4.2.6 Crime and criminal justice 57
4.3 Conclusion 59
Acknowledgements 60
Bibliography 64

1Executive Summary
Executive Summary 
Identity in the UK is changing. Over the next 10 years, people’s identities are likely to be 
significantly affected by several important drivers of change, in particular the rapid pace 
of developments in technology. The emergence of hyper-connectivity (where people can 
now be constantly connected online), the spread of social media, and the increase in online 
personal information, are key factors which will interact to influence identities. These 
developments need to be set within a wider context of demographic change: the shift of the 
large post-war generation into retirement, and the coming into adulthood of young people 
who have been immersed since birth in a digital environment. The increasing diversity of 
the UK’s population means that dual ethnic and national identities will continue to become 
more common, while the gradual trend towards a more secular society appears likely to 
continue over the next decade. A key message for policy makers is that identities can be a 
positive resource for social change, building social capital, and promoting wellbeing, but 
they can also have a role in social unrest and antisocial behaviour.
This Report was commissioned to provide policy makers with a better understanding of identities in the 
UK. It considers the most recent evidence on how identities in the UK might change over the next 10 years. 
It identifies key challenges for effective policy making and implementation in a rapidly changing, globalised, 
technology-rich, and densely networked UK. Specifically, the Report focuses on implications for: crime 
prevention and criminal justice; health, the environment and wellbeing; skills, employment and education; 
preventing radicalisation and extremism; social mobility; and social integration. The findings link into the 
Government’s wider interests in openness and transparency in policy making. 
Key findings
Rather than having a single identity, people have several overlapping identities, which 
shift in emphasis in different life stages and environments. These are changing in three 
important ways: 
•	 Hyper-connectivity:
 Hyper-connectivity is driving social change and expectations, while bringing people together in new ways. By 
2011 there were more than seven billion devices connected to the internet, and numbers are predicted to 
reach 15 billion by 2015. Sixty per cent of internet users in the UK are now members of a social network 
site, increasing from only 17% in 2007. By offering virtually unlimited storage capacity, the internet allows 
people to document any aspect of their lives, creating a wealth of personal data which can be ‘mined’ 
for insights, by private sector companies and potentially by government. This means that people’s online 
identities have value in a way that is new.
 The UK is now a virtual environment as well as a real place, and increasingly UK citizens are globally 
networked individuals. Events which occur elsewhere in the world can have a real and immediate impact in 
the UK. For example, hyper-connectivity can have a positive impact on migrant communities in maintaining 
social connections with family and friends. People have become accustomed to switching seamlessly 
between the internet and the physical world, and use social media to conduct their lives in a way which 
dissolves the divide between online and offline identities. The internet enables people to connect with 
others like themselves and discuss ideas as well as promulgate misinformation, which can quickly become 
widely disseminated. Hyper-connectivity not only has the potential to increase the pace of social change, but 
may also make it more volatile. As such, the internet has not produced a new kind of identity. Rather, it has 
been instrumental in raising awareness that identities are more multiple, culturally contingent and contextual 
than had previously been understood.
2•	 Increasing	social	plurality:	
 Society may become more pluralised, and less integrated, as people’s identities are influenced by the ageing 
population, greater diversity and changing patterns of immigration, and the emergence of online ‘virtual’ 
communities. 
 Demographic change in the UK is leading to shifting intergenerational dynamics. As the large post-war 
cohort reach old-age, the number of over-75 year olds will increase by over a million, from 5.1 million in 
2012 to 6.6 million in 2022, a rise of more than 20%. The Report identifies a shift in attitudes, with the 
emergence of new transitional life stages being defined by attitudes and roles, rather than age. Traditional 
life stages, for example between adolescence and adulthood, or middle-age and old-age, are being delayed 
or blurred together. Shifting intergenerational dynamics will also see a relatively smaller working population. 
Younger people are likely to find achieving the experiences of adulthood more challenging than previous 
generations. In 2011, nearly three million adults aged between 20 and 34 were still living in their parents’ 
home, an increase of almost 20% since 1997. People’s identities are likely to be under greater pressure 
in their family and caring roles, as the number of people providing care to older parents is projected to 
increase from nearly 400,000 in 2005 to about 500,000 in 2041, with most of this increase occurring by 
2022. However, these social changes could also encourage the growth of virtual support networks and 
communities.
 The 2011 Census for England and Wales showed that in 2011, 13% of people resident in England and 
Wales were born outside the UK. The share of the population from minority ethnic groups is projected 
to continue to rise over the next decade, and to become more geographically dispersed. This could have 
implications for ethnic and national identities, as there is evidence from surveys that younger people in 
particular have a more tolerant attitude towards immigrants. 
 Other identities, such as religious identity, seem unlikely to change significantly over the next 10 years. The 
gradual long-term trend towards secularisation is set to continue. The 2011 Census shows that the number 
of people identifying themselves as having ‘no religion’ rose from 15% of the population in 2001 to 25% in 
2011, while the number of people identifying themselves as Christian dropped from 72% in 2001 to 59% in 
2011. However, this trend is less pronounced in Northern Ireland, and among the Muslim and the Roman 
Catholic populations in the rest of the UK. For national identities, growing numbers of people now think of 
themselves as Scottish, Welsh, or English, rather than British. 
•	 Blurring	of	public	and	private	identities:
 People are now more willing to place personal information into public domains, such as on the internet, 
and attitudes towards privacy are changing, especially among younger people. These changes are blurring 
the boundaries between social and work identities. The advent of widespread mobile technology and email 
enables more people to remain connected to their work out of hours. At the same time, posting mobile 
phone photographs and videos online has led to a cultural shift where many people broadcast their daily 
lives and experiences, ceding control over some aspects of identity to others with potentially serious 
consequences for later life. For example, a potential employer might find information online which could 
make a potential candidate unsuitable. This breakdown in the barrier between public and private identities 
could be an important and transformative consequence of social and technological change. The widespread 
use of mobile technology could, in time, allow social media to be linked with spatial tracking and even facial 
recognition technologies. This would allow people to draw on personal information about a stranger in a 
public place, changing the nature of what it means to be anonymous in public spaces.
3Executive Summary
What does identity mean today? 
•	 Identities	are	controlled	both	by	individuals	and	by	others:
 An individual’s ‘identity’ is the sum of those characteristics which determine who a person is. This includes 
a person’s perception of themselves as similar to, or different from, other people. People can choose to 
present certain aspects of their identities, or to disclose particular personal information. Identities can also 
be imposed by others. As many people now have some online presence, their ‘virtual biographies’ can 
be modified or even created by other people and, for example, by companies. Even if a person does not 
create their own online accounts, their families and friends may discuss them or post photographs online. 
•	 People	have	many	overlapping	identities:
 This Report considers several aspects of identities including ethnic, religious, national, age, family, financial, 
and online identities. A person can have all these identities simultaneously, although one identity might be 
more important under particular circumstances. At home a person may find their identity as a parent most 
important, while at work they might identify as a company employee. Online, they may pursue a hobby as 
part of an interest group. Understanding which of a person’s identities are most relevant in a given situation 
depends on the context. Identities are, therefore, culturally contingent and highly contextual, but can also be 
strongly linked to behaviours, both positive (for example volunteering in a community) and negative (such 
as antisocial behaviour). 
•	 People	express	their	identities	in	different	ways:
 Whether a person is included or excluded from a group is important in forming their identity. People’s 
identities are partly created by group membership, but also they may choose to adopt an identity which 
is different from the way in which others stereotype them. A person’s identity is central to their values 
and fundamentally affects health and wellbeing, so freedom of self-expression is important. One of the 
most significant observations of the impact of online identities is the way that some people can feel that 
they have achieved their ‘true’ identity for first time online. For example, some people may socialise more 
successfully and express themselves more freely online. This is one of the ways in which online identities can 
transform offline identities.
•	 Identities	have	value:	
 People’s identities have personal, psychological, social, and commercial value. The growth in the collection 
and use of personal data can have benefits for individuals, organisations and government, by offering greater 
insights through data analysis, and the development of more targeted and more effective services. Identities 
can unify people and can be regarded as a valuable resource for promoting positive social interaction. 
However, this growth in the amount of available data also has the potential for criminal exploitation 
or misuse. Trust is fundamental to achieving positive relationships between people and commercial 
organisations, and between citizens and the state, but surveys show that people are less willing to trust in 
authority than in the past. The British Social Attitudes Survey asked people ‘How much do you trust British 
governments of any party to place the needs of the nation above the interests of their own political party?’. The 
results showed that the percentage of people who responded ‘Almost never’ increased from 11.8% in 1986 
to 33.5% in 2011. Maintaining a balance between privacy, freedom and protection, and regaining trust will 
remain a key challenge for government in making best use of ‘big data’. 
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This Report is the result of a one-year ‘Policy Futures’ project undertaken by Foresight, in the Government 
Office for Science. The aim of the Project was to come to a broad and independent scientific view of 
changing identities in the UK through a synthesis of existing evidence from a range of academic disciplines, 
including computer science, criminology, the social sciences and the humanities. The Report is based on 20 
evidence reviews, commissioned from leading UK and international experts, which explore key aspects of 
how identities in the UK are currently understood, and how they might change over the next 10 years. These 
are published alongside this Report. As identity is such a wide-ranging subject, the Report focuses on those 
trends and issues affecting identities that are of most interest to UK policy makers.
Implications for policy makers in six key areas: 
•	 Crime	prevention	and	criminal	justice:
 There is a distinction to be made between a traditional type of crime which is now committed using a 
computer, and a crime wholly enabled by the internet. The growing quantity of personal and financial data 
online, as facial recognition technology, ‘big data’ and social media together begin to connect information 
about individuals, means that there will be more opportunities for criminal exploitation and cybercrime. 
Creating a false identity or stealing another person’s identity is often achieved through obtaining key 
personal information, so the distinction between a person’s ‘identity’ (in terms of their overall sense of self) 
and the identification used to distinguish between people online is being increasingly blurred in practice. 
Ultimately, stealing sufficient information could enable a criminal to effectively take over victims’ online 
identities. However, there are also opportunities for enhanced crime prevention, intelligence gathering, and 
crime detection. ‘Open source’ intelligence will become more important for detecting patterns of criminal 
behaviour, but the quantity of data available will make locating and analysing relevant data more problematic, 
and will require the right skills and resources. The foundation of English law is a liberal society where social 
identity is, as far as possible, a personally defined and freely chosen individual possession, and so the legal 
system will need to continue to ensure that people’s online and offline identities are protected.
•	 Health,	environment	and	wellbeing:
 The environment is very important in forming and understanding identities. For example, many places can 
be restorative, and so policies which promote green spaces and protect the countryside can be important 
for health and wellbeing. The implications of changing identities for the built environment, transport, 
infrastructure, and mitigating the effects of climate change will need to be considered by policy makers. The 
development and application of biomedical technologies, such as drugs to improve memory and cognition, 
and developments in reproductive technologies, could have the potential to transform the way that people 
relate to themselves, each other, and their environment. However, there are complex ethical and practical 
implications for government in regulating and responding to these technologies.
•	 Skills,	employment	and	education:
 Digital literacy is essential in enabling people to make full use of computer technology and the internet to 
express their identities, and to connect with social media, services, and information. A critical issue for the 
future will be to ensure that individuals have the knowledge, understanding, and technological literacy to 
enable them to take control of their own online identities, and to be aware of their online presence and 
how it could be used by others. 
•	 Radicalisation	and	extremism:
 The trends towards greater social plurality, declining trust in authority, and increasing take-up of new 
technologies may all pose challenges for policy makers seeking to manage radicalisation and extremism. 
Trends in changing identities in the UK over the next 10 years will be crucial to understanding these issues.
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•	 Social	mobility:
 The findings of the Report indicate that understanding and improving social mobility will become even 
more complex in the future. Some of the trends suggest that there will be more divergence between 
groups. Perceptions of unfairness in access to opportunities, rather than actual inequality, may in turn 
reinforce certain kinds of social identities and increase the potential for collective action. However, as 
access to the internet and hyper-connectivity increase, information and education may become more freely 
available and shared, enhancing life opportunities for many individuals.
•	 Social	integration:
 Greater social plurality, demographic trends, and the gradual reduction in importance of some traditional 
aspects of identity, suggest that communities in the UK are likely to become less cohesive over the next 
10 years. However, hyper-connectivity can also create or strengthen new group identities. Policy makers 
will need to consider indirect as well as direct implications of policy for communities and people’s sense of 
belonging. It is important to recognise that policies can interact with identities in complex and unpredictable 
ways. Awareness of this should be built into plans for monitoring policy implementation and responding to 
outcomes. There are also opportunities for policy to support social integration and acknowledge new forms 
of community as they develop.
Conclusion
Over the next decade, identities in the UK are likely to undergo important changes, and will be increasingly 
dynamic or volatile. Simple categorisations based on traditional notions of identities are likely to become less 
meaningful. This will affect society and influence the way that people live their lives. In future, the UK needs to be 
considered as much a part of the virtual world as a real place. Increasingly, its citizens will be globally networked, 
hyper-connected individuals, and this has substantial implications for what is meant by communities and by 
social integration. 
The increasing speed and connectivity of information technology systems offers opportunities for monitoring 
what is happening in real time, and assessing the effectiveness of specific policies. For policy makers, understanding 
the changing nature of identity in the UK will be increasingly important for effective policy making and 
implementation. Failure to do so may lead to missed opportunities to, for example, strengthen social integration, 
reduce exclusion, enhance open policy making, and make effective use of identities as a resource. Government 
would also benefit from drawing upon a deeper scientific understanding of people’s evolving identities when 
developing, implementing and testing policies, for example in initiatives such as ‘Test, Learn, Adapt’. Policy making 
across many different areas will need to be more iterative, adaptive, nuanced and agile, taking into consideration 
the multifaceted nature of people’s identities and how policies might affect different groups, or individuals, at 
different times and places.
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understand better how people’s identities in the UK might change over the next 10 years. 
The impact of new technologies and increasing uptake of online social media, the effects 
of globalisation, environmental disruption, the consequences of the economic downturn, 
and growing social and cultural diversity are all important drivers of change for identities. 
However, there is a gap in understanding how identities might change in the future, and how 
policy makers might respond to such change.
1.1 Aim
The aim of this Foresight Report is to consider how changes over the next 10 years will affect identities in the 
UK. The Report takes a broad and independent view of the current evidence for the drivers of change affecting 
identity in the UK over the next decade, bringing together for the first time current evidence and pointing out 
some of the main implications for policy makers. To ensure the Report is robust and relevant, the research was 
overseen by a group of senior academic experts who formed the Lead Expert Group, and reviewed by a group 
of policy officials from across relevant Government departments. The Report is based on a set of 20 driver 
reviews which were commissioned to explore different aspects of changing identitiesi. 
This Report takes as its starting point the current findings of research in social sciences, which understand 
identity not as a singular, fixed or innate state of being, but conceptualises individuals as having multiple, dynamic, 
overlapping identities. These can be broadly grouped as ‘social’ identities, ‘biographical’ identities, and ‘biometric’ 
identities. Social identities refer to where individuals define themselves in relation to others, either as part of 
a group or in contrast to others. Biographical identities concern attributes such as names, age, and gender. 
There are also unique characteristics such as DNA and fingerprints which form biometric identities, which 
were beyond the scope of the project. This Report is mainly focused on how a person’s social and biographical 
identities might change over the next 10 years, how behaviour might alter as a result, and what the implications 
for policy makers are likely to be.
1.2 Who is the Report for?
Identities are a very broad topic and of interest to many different parts of government as well as other 
organisations. This Report is aimed at UK Government decision makers, and has diverse implications for many 
policy areas. Because identities encompass such a broad area, only those aspects of most relevance for policy 
makers have been considered. 
People’s identities are an important subject which has been addressed in a wide range of academic research, but 
there has been limited analysis of how identities might change in the future. The current evidence suggests that 
several key drivers of change are already affecting identities and will continue to do so in the future. Identities 
are also a factor in driving change itself, because identities affect behaviour. For example, people may choose 
to live in a particular area or buy a particular product because it fits with their perception of themselves and 
i The driver reviews are listed in the bibliography and are freely available to download at http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight
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their identities. Identities can create feedback loops which can reinforce or disrupt a trend. They are therefore 
fundamental to how people understand themselves and their place in the world, how they relate to others, and 
how they behave in consequence. This makes them important for policy makers in developing and delivering policy.
This Report aims to help policy makers gain a better understanding of the complex relationships between policies, 
individuals, and their identities, which interact in sometimes unexpected ways. There are several insights that can 
be drawn out for policy makers in particular policy areas. There are also broader implications about the nature 
of policy making, and the need for a sensitive and nuanced approach which takes into account identities, and 
benefit from an understanding of how policy might affect different groups, and how they in turn might respond.
1.3 How the Report is organised 
Chapter 1 introduces the Report. The chapter explains the rationale for undertaking this project, the aim, and 
the intended audience. 
Chapter 2 defines the concept of identity used in this Report. ‘Identity’ has been widely discussed in many 
academic disciplines and defined in a number of different ways: this section briefly explains the background 
to academic research into identity and makes clear how ‘identities’ are understood and used in this Report. 
Chapter 2 goes on to explain why it is important for policy makers to consider identities.
Chapter 3 forms the main body of the Report. It brings together the current evidence relating to how 
identities are formed and changed, and analyses the main drivers of change which might affect identities over 
the next 10 years. It is divided into five thematic sections: social, technological, economic, environmental, and 
political categories. 
•	 Social	drivers of change which are considered relevant to identities include demographic changes, such as 
an ageing population, shifting intergenerational roles and responsibilities, and young people who have been 
brought up in a digital environment. The section goes on to discuss patterns of religion in the UK and the 
gradual trend towards increasing secularisation, increasing cultural and ethnic diversity, and the emergence 
of ‘hyper-connectivity’ as a social phenomenon, where the spread of mobile computing technology has 
enabled people to be always connected to the internet.
•	 Technological drivers include the development of online identities as the internet matures, the expansion 
of social media into the daily lives and relationships of many people, and the potential for ‘big data’ as 
more personal information is held online and can be mined for insights by private sector organisations and 
governments. The potential for issues over the ownership of personal information, and for cybercrime such 
as identity theft, is discussed. The section goes on to discuss biomedical technologies and their implications 
for identities.
•	 Economic	drivers for identity changes are discussed with reference to the impact on identities from the 
economic downturn combined with the consumer identities created by modern culture.
•	 Environmental factors for identities include place attachment and the threats posed to identities by changes 
which threaten valued places, and the role of the built environment in creating identities influencing where 
and how people live. The section goes on to consider environmental change and risks, such as flooding, and 
the potential impacts on community and individual identities.
•	 Political trends considered in this section include the long-term trend of declining trust in authority in 
the UK, including trust in government, and national identities focusing on ‘Britishness’ as a component of 
people’s identities.
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It draws out three main themes for future changes to identities, based on the evidence set out in the previous 
chapter, and goes on to explore these themes for six key areas of government policy: social mobility; social 
integration; radicalisation and extremism; health, environment and wellbeing; skills, employment and education; 
and crime and criminal justice. 
Box 1.1: Scenarios
Scenarios developed for this Project explore how identities might change over the next 10 years. They were 
created by identifying a series of potential events and trends which might plausibly occur over the next decade 
in the UK. Two characters, ‘Esther’ and ‘Dylan’, were then created and used to populate a storyline for the 
Report. Their lives and characters were developed to imagine how the events and trends might affect them. 
The storylines for Esther and Dylan are set out in boxes throughout Chapter 3.
The scenarios provided useful insights to interpret the drivers of change, and to show how these drivers of 
change may affect individuals’ daily lives. They are used, for example in Section 2.1, to illustrate how different 
identities become more salient according to the particular context, and in Chapter 3 the scenarios draw out 
key points of the analysis. The characters show how these drivers can impact very differently on individuals in 
their everyday lives: an important consideration for policy makers.
92. What is identity and why does it matter?
2.1 Definition of an individual’s identity
An individual’s ‘identity’ can be defined as those characteristics which determine who a person is: this includes 
an individual’s perception of themself as similar to, or different from, other people, but identities can also be 
imposed by others. Dictionary definitions of ‘identity’ owe much to a more simplistic notion of ‘identity’ made 
popular during the 1950s by the developmental psychologist Erik Erikson21 through his work on psychosocial 
stages of development and his coining of the term ‘identity crisis’. His concept of ‘ego identity’ as a term in 
psychology suggested that identity is shaped by the interaction of three elements: a person’s biological 
characteristics, their psychology, and the cultural context. He emphasised the sameness and consistency of 
identity over time, so that in different times and places, a person continues to have an innate sense of being 
the same person, although their circumstances may change and cause a shift in their sense of self-identity22. 
Since then, however, identity has become a key concept in a wide range of academic disciplines including 
political science, the social sciences, and the humanities, and definitions of identity have expanded accordingly. 
There is, therefore, no single agreed-upon definition2. It is worth noting the historical and culturally-specific 
nature of much academic research into identity, as a concern of Western, urbanised, technologically-advanced, 
societies, which some see as a symptom of social complexity and uncertainty. Others have explored identity 
from a socio-cultural perspective, as individual narratives to bring diverse elements into an integrated whole, 
or focused on the transition from adolescence to adulthood as a time of ‘finding’ an identity22.
These different interpretations have shown that identities are socially constructed and highly complex. Many 
different types of identity are now discussed, such as cultural identity, organisational identity, and national identity 
(at the level of the nation-state). Even for an individual, there are multiple possible identities, which overlap, and can 
change over time or in different circumstances. People therefore each have an identity which is the sum of many 
different aspects about themselves, and together these give them a fundamental sense of meaning in their lives.
This Report does not attempt to be comprehensive in covering all aspects of people’s identities, but shows that 
identities can be best understood as complex, multifaceted, and highly contextual. The Report therefore refers 
to a person’s ‘identities’ rather than ‘identity’ in the following terms:
• Identities refer to the way in which individuals perceive themselves and their place in the world, and how 
they are categorised by others. People have coexisting, multifaceted, overlapping identities, which alter 
in emphasis depending upon the context. At home a person might find their identity as a parent most 
important, while at work they might identify as a company employee, and online pursue a hobby as part 
of an interest group. Some identities can change over the life course of an individual.
• Identities can be elective or chosen by an individual, such as by self-categorised membership of a social 
group, or ascribed and controlled by others, for example through data held on a person by a supermarket. 
• Identities can be inclusive, such as membership of a family, team, religion or other group, or exclusive, defined 
by not being a member of a particular group. Again, these identities can be controlled by the individual or 
by others, for instance through rejection from a group.
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Three overlapping types of identities can be broadly distinguished: social, biographical, and biometric (see Figure 2.1):
•	 	Social	identities	are generated through roles and relationships between people, and the wider social and 
cultural context. These include identities which are socially mediated, such as family relationships, friendships, 
membership of communities, and attachment to particular places.
•	 	Biographical	identities are more ‘standalone’ identities which individuals might use to describe themselves 
to another or how they perceive themselves. These might include national identity, as well as ethnicity and 
religion – although these also have a strong social role. Identities such as a professional role or financial 
status might also be considered biographical identities.
•	 	Biometric	identities	are those aspects of identity related to the body, including unique characteristics such 
as DNA, fingerprints, irises and faces, which can be used as a means of authentication to verify that people 
are who they say they are. Biometric identities are beyond the scope of this Report (and so are marked by 
a dotted line in Figure 2.1).
Figure	2.1:	Types	of	identities:	social,	biographical	and	biometric	identities	and	some	examples	of	each	type.
BIOMETRIC
BIOGRAPHICALSOCIAL
Age
Faces
Gender
Disability
Nationality
Place
attachment
Profession
Community
Family
Hobbies
Financial
status
Ethnicity
Fingerprints
Irises DNA
Religion
Source: Foresight
An individual therefore has a coherent sense of self which is constructed from many components, and these 
could be considered as different ‘identities’. Some aspects of an individual’s identity are less likely to change 
(gender, disability, or sexuality): these have been excluded from this work, as drivers of change will have little 
impact upon them. Ethnic identity, while unlikely to change significantly for an individual over their life, is an 
important element of how people define themselves and others, and at the wider community level, ethnic 
identities can be affected by drivers of change, so ethnicity is one of the identities discussed in this Report. 
Some types of identities change only very gradually over a lifespan (for example, age), while others have the 
potential to change over time, or may remain fairly stable (such as national or religious identity, or attachment 
to places such as where people live or work). For these identities any future changes are likely to be slow, 
particularly over the 10 year time period considered in this Report. However, other elements which form social 
identities can be more changeable, overlapping, or even volatile, for example, when people belong to different 
communities (including online communities) or friendship groups. Some stages of life carry shifting family roles 
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and responsibilities which give rise to distinct identities (for example, being a child, being in a relationship, 
becoming a parent or grandparent), while professional and financial identities can change as jobs, status, careers 
and experiences alter. People can also have identities related to hobbies, leisure and consumption, which for 
some people can change rapidly, while others maintain their ‘hobbies’ as a core part of themselves over a long 
period of time.
It is clear, therefore, that the context is important in understanding which identities are more relevant at any 
one time or place. People are affected by contexts in different ways. Figure 2.2 illustrates this idea for two 
hypothetical ‘personas’, named ‘Esther’ and ‘Dylan’, which are characters developed for the scenarios in this 
Report (introduced in Chapter 1 and discussed in this chapter and Chapter 3). The figure shows for each 
persona a number of different aspects of their identities, as described above, and plots for illustrative purposes 
how their identities shift in importance according to changing circumstances. In Figure 2.2, Esther’s religion and 
ethnicity are not important parts of who she is in the four contexts shown, while she finds her community and 
friendship group and hobbies are very important aspects of her identity when she uses social media online. 
Dylan finds his ethnic identity as a Welshman is important to him when at work, and has a stronger religious 
identity at home compared with Esther.
2.2 Why do identities matter to policy makers?
There are several reasons why identities are important for policy makers in government.
•	 Identities	are	integral	to	mental	health	and	wellbeing as they determine to a great extent how a person 
understands their place in the world, and how they relate to others23. Maintaining and expressing multiple 
identities freely is important for individual wellbeing and social integration24. For an individual, their various 
identities are fundamental to selfhood and are deeply rooted in their psychology.
•	 Identities	influence	people’s	behaviour, but are not necessarily predictive of behaviour, especially at the 
level of the individual. While identities can provide a guide to likely behaviours (for example, a worker 
would be expected to travel to their place of work), it is important to understand which identities could 
come to the fore at any particular time and disrupt behavioural patterns (for example, the worker might 
instead stay at home to care for their sick child). As there are many potential variables which can affect the 
situation, it is problematic to extrapolate in simple terms from an ‘identity’ to ‘behaviour’. 
•	 Identities	are	highly	valued by individuals as a fundamental part of themselves. A person’s identities can 
have personal, psychological, social, and also commercial value3 5. Identities are also valued by social groups, 
businesses, corporations, and nation states, for example through names, national insurance numbers, 
passports, online passwords and signatures, which are the basis for how people operate in the modern 
world. For corporations, identities are crucial to their brand; while national identities are important for 
states19. The commercial value of identities is, of course, of interest to the private sector, and also to 
criminals interested in exploiting identities. For government, identities are a resource that can be drawn 
upon to deliver better services, and used as an analytical framework for understanding policy implications.
•	 Identities	can	be	a	resource	for	social	change mediated through networks of social relationships, 
membership of groups, shared aspirations and ideologies. Identities as part of groups and communities 
contribute to building social capital, and so these identities can sometimes be mobilised to influence social 
or behavioural change10. This can be a positive force for social good, exemplified by the solidarity seen in the 
London 2012 Olympics and Paralympics, or a destructive force, for example the 2011 riots in parts of the 
UK. Due to the development and spread of new technologies, mobile smart-phones, social networking, and 
the trend towards hyper-connectivity, disparate groups can be more easily mobilised where their interests 
temporarily coincide7; for example, a ‘flash mob’ii can be quickly mobilised between people who have not 
previously met.
ii A ‘flash mob’ is the term used to describe a recent phenomenon where a group of people assemble in a public place, sometimes to perform an 
action, and then quickly disperse, and is often organised through telecommunications, social media or email.
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Figure	2.2:	This	diagram	shows	how,	for	two	hypothetical	people,	the	various	elements	which	make	up	their	
identities	can	shift	in	emphasis.	
As a particular aspect of identity becomes more important, the line moves outwards, while less important identities are nearer 
the centre. Four different contexts are shown for each person, exploring how identities alter in emphasis according to the 
context. The plots are based on information generated from the scenarios for two personas, Esther and Dylan, which are used  
to explore some of the key drivers of change in Chapter 3.
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•	 Identities	are	often	focused	on	local and	personal	issues, as people’s sense of self and daily activities can 
be more affected by local events, community, family, friends and personal experiences than by major events 
or sociocultural trends. However, the very local can now be closely linked to global events, due to the 
well-documented impact of globalisation and the ease of modern, global communications. The UK is now 
connected to events around the world with high-speed communication networks, and so social integration 
in local areas can be affected by events in another country; the new ‘glocalism’25. However, the same trends 
can act to increase social capital26, bringing together communities around new hubs of interest. 
Understanding how drivers of change might affect social and biographical identities over the next decade is 
important for government. For example, the value of identities should be an important consideration when 
designing policy initiatives that seek to amalgamate and use data sets, or provide new online digital services, 
where the balance between privacy and security is being carefully considered.
This Report sets out the changing trends which could affect identities in the UK over the next 10 years and 
draws out some of the implications for policy of changing identities. Trends which could affect identities, such as 
new technology, and hyper-connectivity, where individuals are constantly connected to the internet, are highly 
complex and can be difficult to predict. In the past, people have failed to predict the ubiquity of computing, of 
text messaging, and of mobile phone technology1 20. Several important changes can already be anticipated, such as 
the increased use of social media and mobile computing technology, but it is difficult to predict with any degree of 
certainty how these changes may develop over the next 10 years. Managing uncertainty amid the accelerating pace 
of technological change will be a critical issue for government over the next decade and beyond.
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This chapter explores many of the drivers of change that have the potential to affect 
people’s identities in the UK over the next decade. New technologies including social media, 
the generation of ‘big data’, and a constantly networked population, are considered to 
be among the main drivers of change over the next decade; while religious and national 
identities are likely to remain stable, or change more slowly. Demographic trends will bring 
about gradual change in some identities as attitudes to age shift, while wider economic 
trends and the impact of the economic downturn may particularly affect some socio-
economic groups.
There are many key drivers of change affecting identities in the UK, such as demographic change, the impacts of 
new and emerging technologies, the current economic downturn, and changes to the environment. Some are 
developing rapidly, such as the impact of social media and mobile computing technology that enables people to 
be always connected to the internet wherever they are23. The increasingly dense networks of information and 
rapid pace of development in communications technology will continue to transform the ways in which people 
interact, both locally and globally27. Other drivers of change may act more slowly. Over the next decade these 
various trends will influence how people perceive themselves and others (their social identities), the groups they 
form or join, and their national and political identities (their biographical identities).
People’s identities can both be affected by change, and drive future developments. For example, identities can 
be manipulated for marketing purposes to promote a product as a ‘lifestyle’ accessory or the latest must-have 
technology for young people28. Identities can also be a factor in bringing about new developments, as people are 
not passive consumers, but are able to make choices29. For example, an ageing population could drive demand 
for advances in medicine and new consumer products. Therefore, in considering drivers of change and how they 
might affect identities over the next 10 years, it is important to recognise the role of identities in co-creating 
some of these changes, and also the uncertainties inherent in any futures-orientated analysis. This chapter 
analyses the likely trends of different drivers and their possible impacts on people’s identities in the UK over the 
next decade. It should be noted that the future trends described here are not intended to be predictive but to 
explore plausible future trajectories.
These drivers are grouped into five broad categories: social, technological, economic, environmental, and political.
3.1 Social drivers
3.1.1 An ageing population
Demographic trends and an ageing society are important social drivers of change. The effects of demographic 
changes are affecting not only social and economic policies in the UK, but also people’s identities, attitudes and 
behaviours. This section explores some of the main demographic trends affecting UK society and considers how 
they might influence people’s identities over the next decade.
The Office for National Statistics models the major trends for the UK’s population over the next 75 years using 
assumptions about future levels of fertility, mortality, and migration based on the previous five years30. These 
projections do not take into account the impact that new or future government policies, changing economic 
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circumstances or other factors might have on future demographic behaviour31, but provide a useful assessment 
of how the population of the UK will change. Predictions show a gradual increase in the size of the population 
of the UK by 4.8 million people over the next decade from an estimated 63.2 million in 2012 to 68.1 million 
in 202232. It is expected that this trend will continue with a predicted population of 73.2 million by mid-2035 
(Figure 3.1). It is estimated that some 68% of projected population growth in the period to 2035 will be 
attributable, directly or indirectly, to net migration33. Because demographic changes are so gradual, Figure 3.1 
shows the data projected out to 2035 in order to clearly demonstrate the long-term trends.
Figure	3.1:	Estimated	and	projected	age	structure	of	the	UK	population,	mid-2010	and	mid-2035.
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Predictions show there will be a slight increase in the median age of the UK population, rising from 39.9 years in 
2012 to 40.1 years in 202232, which is forecast to continue to 2035 (Figure 3.1). This will coincide with the entry 
of the large UK post-war birth cohorts into late middle and old age13, so the proportion of older people will be 
greater, with the number of over-75 year olds increasing from 5.1 million in 2012 to 6.6 million in 2022, a rise of 
more than 20%35. Greater numbers of older people, living for longer, mean that pension arrangements will be a 
rising cost for the state and for businesses. Meanwhile, the number of children aged under 16 is projected, based 
on the Office for National Statistics’ assumptions about future fertility, mortality and migration, to grow slightly 
from 11.8 million in 2012 to 13.2 million in 2022, a rise of 3.6%, and continue to rise until 202635.
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This changing age composition of the UK population is being driven by the combined effects of increased 
longevity and falling fertility rates. Life expectancy has been steadily increasing, and some have suggested that 
since 2000, half of those born each year can expect to reach 100 years of age36. The two-child family remains 
the most common family type. In 2010, family size for women who had completed their families averaged 1.91 
children37. The UK’s Total Fertility Rate has remained mainly below replacement levels (2.0) since the 1970s38 39 
and this trend is expected to continue with a projected Total Fertility Rate of 1.88 by 202235. Within this overall 
trend, the proportion of births to non-UK born women has increased from 22% in 2007 to 24% of all births 
in the UK in 201140. Total Fertility Rates are higher for non-UK born women (2.28 in 2011, compared with 1.89 
for UK born women). The top five countries of origin for non-UK born mothers in 2011 were Poland, Pakistan, 
India, Bangladesh, and Nigeria. 
As these demographic changes are so gradual, overall the patterns of family and household living will not 
change significantly over the next 10 years. However, there may be changes to identities generated by changing 
attitudes towards different age groups. Traditionally, life stages have been defined as childhood, adolescence, 
young adulthood, middle-age, and old-age. However, an important trend for people’s identities is the emergence 
of new life stages13, such as the more prolonged transitions between adolescence and adulthood (‘emerging 
adulthood’, referring to people in their 20s and early 30s) and between middle-age and old-age (‘older 
adulthood’: roughly between the ages 60 and 75)41 42, with a fluid period of reaching ‘full adulthood’ and then 
‘middle adulthood’ sandwiched in between13. Increasingly these life stages are being either delayed, extended, or 
blurred together, and are likely to become even more fluid in future13. ‘Older adulthood’ describes a group who 
are largely healthy and still active, while ‘old-age adulthood’ refers to those aged 75 and over, some of whom are 
declining or frail13. These categories give rise to different needs and services, for example the increased incidence 
of chronic health problems and mental decline such as dementia has produced an increased focus on health 
provision and social support for the very elderly43. By 2022 the present ‘baby boomers’ will be moving from 
older adulthood into old-age as they begin to approach and turn 8013, an important transition for many from 
relative independence to increasing dependency. 
Reaching traditional ‘full adulthood’ is marked by a convergence of life course transitions, age, individual 
experiences, and cohort experiences, such as getting married or cohabiting, becoming a parent, moving away 
from the parental home, setting up a home and becoming established in a career. By 2022 those people in 
‘emerging adulthood’ (post-adolescence) may face very different life experiences and find it more difficult to 
achieve these ‘full adulthood’ rites of passage13, for example by remaining in or moving back into the parental 
home. In 2011, nearly 3 million adults aged between 20 and 34 were living in their parents’ home, an increase 
of almost half a million, or 20%, since 1997, despite the number of people in this age group being similar in 
1997 and 201144. They may therefore continue more youthful patterns of material consumption and activities, 
undertaking periods of education and employment interspersed with sabbaticals for leisure13. 
The gradual shift in different age groups discussed above means that the dependency ratio – the ratio between 
those of working age (aged 16–64) and those either under-16 or 65 and over – will alter gradually too. The 
number of dependants per 1,000 persons of working age is projected to alter from 615 in 2012 to 628 in 202235. 
This could lead to greater stresses upon the ‘middle’ generations, especially those with caring responsibilities, 
and increasing demands on the state for health, welfare, and social care provision. There will be greater demand 
for informal care of older people by their spouses and children. The number of people providing care to older 
parents is projected to increase by 27.5% between 2005 and 2041, from nearly 400,000 in 2005 to around 
500,000 in 2041, with most of this increase occurring by 202245. People’s identities may be under greater 
pressure from their different roles as carers, parents, and children, and balancing their working and family lives 
may be difficult. There may be increasing resentment against the burdens faced by those who find themselves 
still in work later than they anticipated, caring for elderly parents and providing resources and housing for older 
children or divorced adult offspring returning home.
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An ageing UK population will alter intergenerational relationships and change the make-up of workforces as 
average retirement ages rise. The number of people of state pension ageiii and above still in employment nearly 
doubled between 1993 and 2011, to 1.4 million in 201146, and seems likely to continue growing. While population 
predictions show there will be larger numbers of people aged 65 and older47, changes to the state pension age 
for women along with the removal of statutory retirement ages mean that they will not necessarily be retired 
from work. However, this trend will not offset the overall change in the dependency ratio between working and 
non-working sections of the population. 
Living longer and healthier lives means that traditional age-based social categories are becoming less important 
for people in the UK. Age may become less of a factor compared with the specific situation faced by the 
individual, in terms of family, where they live, elderly dependants, and whether or not they are in work. For 
many people aged 65 and over, their age is not a crucial part of their identity, but health, socio-economic status, 
and family relationships are more important, for example being a parent, or grandparent48. For this age group, 
wellbeing is seen as being able to continue doing the things they have always been able to do49. For the more 
affluent middle classes, a comfortable and leisured early old-age can be enjoyed while health lasts. However, 
this will not be the case for all, as many people will lack the financial resources needed to achieve this level 
of comfort and security. The scenarios developed for this Report illustrate some of these issues and their 
implications for people’s identities, using the persona of Dylan who is contemplating an uncertain future 
in retirement (see Box 3.1: Dylan 2013).
Box 3.1: Dylan 2013
These scenarios illustrate how drivers of change may affect 
individuals in different contexts (see Chapter 2 for an introduction 
to the scenarios)
Dylan is a Welsh former miner living in South Wales. In 2013 he is 60 years old. He is working as a trained 
mountain guide, but the work is low-paid and he is struggling financially. Although he has looked for work 
elsewhere, he has been unable to find better-paid employment and suspects people are unwilling to take him 
on because of his age. His wife is now the major wage earner, with her job in retail managing a local shop. She 
is more computer-literate than he is, having had to use computers for her work, and has Facebook and Skype 
accounts, which are mainly used to keep in touch with their family. They have been married for 35 years and 
have two adult children, a son living in Australia and a daughter in London. His daughter rents a flat with a 
friend. She had wanted to buy a place of her own, but Dylan could not afford to help her out with a deposit. 
Dylan’s elderly mother is suffering from dementia and living in a private care home near Swansea, but he rarely 
visits her, preferring to remember her the way she was. Dylan enjoys spending time drinking with his rugby club 
friends, and rarely, if ever, uses the internet. The tourists he meets through work keep him up-to-date with most 
of the news issues.
iii State pension age is now between 65 and 68 depending when someone was born. Statutory retirement age in the UK was 65, but this limit was 
abolished in 2011.
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3.1.2 Young people
Many commentators have noted the emergence of a new ‘Generation Z’, loosely defined as those born after 
the mid-1990s (under-18 year olds) who are immersed from an early age in a digital environment and are 
comfortable with new technology50. They can have better computer skills than their parents51 and expect to 
access services online, but levels of understanding of online safety and security are varied and they may not 
know where to turn for advice52. This age group has high expectations as consumers53, with an emphasis on 
purchasing new technology and experiences, such as holidays54. Their mind-set will be very different from that 
of previous generations: this will have major implications for policy makers in understanding how these young 
people relate to the world and integrate into society.
Adolescents and young adults are adversely affected by the economic downturn as well as by broader labour 
market trends55. The most recent labour market statistics for July to September 2012 showed that, excluding 
those in full-time education, there were 648,000 unemployed 16–24 year olds in the UK, 18.7% of the 
economically active population, down by 65,000 from the preceding April–June period56. From 2008 to 2010, 
the number of 16–18 year olds not in education, employment, or training (NEET) increased from 811,000 to 
928,000, or from 13.6% to 15.4%57. These younger people have fewer skills and little experience, and are often 
cheap to make redundant58. Over the next 10 years, those currently under 24 years old are likely to have more 
delayed transitions to established ‘full adulthood’ identities than in the past13, as they might find it harder to find 
stable jobs. In turn they may delay marriage or cohabitation, and be less able to secure mortgages that would 
allow them to settle down as homeowners. Socio-economic factors are also important, as middle-income young 
adults can make later transitions to adult lifestyle status, while those who grow up in poverty and experience 
hardships identify as adults earlier, in their teens or early twenties59.
Both younger and older people can feel discriminated against because of their age60 and social stereotyping of 
particular identities. As the numbers of under-16s and over-60s rise over the next two decades, this issue may 
become even more prominent. Some people perceive adolescents as being linked to antisocial behaviour or 
disorder, which can increase fear of crime61. Young people in the UK may also become increasingly alienated by 
the apparent concentration of power and wealth in the hands of the baby-boomer generation, and also by their 
difficulty in finding the kinds of jobs they had been led to expect62. UK graduates who have paid tuition fees 
may feel entitled to expect well-paid roles, while employers will want specific skill sets for the changing labour 
markets. The difference in expectations may lead to resentment among those who feel there are reduced 
opportunities for younger people. The scenarios developed for this Report explore this idea using a character 
called Esther, who is a graduate burdened with debt and struggling to establish a career (see Box 3.2: Esther 2013).
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Box 3.2: Esther 2013
These scenarios illustrate how drivers of change may affect 
individuals in different contexts (see Chapter 2 for an introduction 
to these scenarios)
In 2013, Esther is a 22 year old History of Art graduate living in Yorkshire. She is an active user of several social 
networking sites and often updates her Facebook pages, runs her own online blog on art, including posting 
photographs of her own paintings, and has a large digital footprint. Although Esther has tried to sell her own 
paintings, both online and in small local exhibitions, she hasn’t made much money from them. Esther has a full-
time job, an entry-level job at a large UK bank, but she isn’t earning enough to rent or buy her own flat, so she 
is living at home with her parents and commutes into Leeds for work. Although this isn’t her dream job, Esther 
has a £10,000 debt from her university days, and as her job pays just over the threshold for repayment, she has 
begun to pay off her debt. Esther considers herself quite fortunate as most of the friends she graduated with 
have not been able to find work at all, or are in temporary low-paid work. However, her job and the commute 
leaves her little time to pursue her hobbies and ambitions.
3.1.3 Religion and secularisation
Since the 1980s religious identities in the UK have shown a long-term trend towards increasing secularisation14 63. 
While the main religion in the UK is Christianity, church attendance has been declining64 and the Christian 
religion has become less important for many people’s identities. The secularisation trend is shown in the 2011 
Census, in which the number of people identifying themselves as having no religion rose from 14.8% of the 
population in 2001 to 25.1% of the population in 2011, while the numbers of people identifying themselves 
as Christian dropped from 72% in 2001 to 59% in 201165. Younger people tend to be less religious than older 
people66, as shown in a 2011 Office for National Statistics survey, where 87.6% of over-65 year olds identified 
themselves as Christian compared with 59.7% of under-20 years olds (Table 3.1)67. As younger, generally less 
religious, generations replace older generations, it is likely that overall, religiosity will plateau at a low level but 
not necessarily decrease further14. The secularisation trend is so gradual that it is very likely that the strength of 
UK religious identity will not be significantly altered over the next 10 years14.
Table	3.1:	Religion	by	age	group	(%),	Integrated	Household	Survey	April	2010	to	March	2011.
Religion Under 20 16–28 25–38 35–53 50–68 65+
Christian 59.7 58.9 55.4 66.8 78.3 87.6
Buddhist 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.1
Hindu 1.3 1.5 2.4 1.4 1.1 0.6
Jewish 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7
Muslim 7.9 5.5 6.4 4.0 1.9 1.1
Sikh 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.4
Any other religion 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.1
No religion at all 29.0 31.6 32.5 25.0 15.9 8.4
Source: Office for National Statistics67.
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However, there are smaller counter-trends. The overall UK trend of rising secularisation is less pronounced 
in Northern Ireland, and among both the Muslim and the Roman Catholic populations in the rest of UK68. 
The immigrant minority ethnic population in the UK are more religious on average than the White Britishiv 
population. Among British minority ethnic groups, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Black Africans seem significantly 
more likely to assert the importance of their religion to their identity. However, these groups are showing 
similar patterns of intergenerational decline, with the ‘second generation’v being generally less religious than their 
immigrant parents69.
While still showing the same intergenerational trend towards secularisation70 71, religiosity among the Muslim 
community is declining only very slowly, so Muslims are more likely to state that their religious identity is 
important to them15. There may be several reasons for this trend, including a component of religious revival, 
a reaction against perceived hostility towards Muslims, and the impact of international events72. For those who 
do continue to assert strong religious identities, the meaning or implications of their religiosity may be different 
from those of their parents; for example, these individuals might feel that they are asserting a ‘pure’ version of 
the faith72, or one that is compatible with less ‘traditional’ attitudes or behaviours15 73. Some analysts suggest that 
the decline in religious identity in some sectors of society and across generations may reverse74, so the children 
of non-religious parents may nevertheless assert a religious faith. This appears to be particularly the case among 
young Muslims.
3.1.4 Diversity
The 2011 Census showed that 80.5% of the population of England and Wales identify themselves as White 
British, with London being the most ethnically diverse area and Wales the least diverse75. The Census showed 
that in 2011, 13% of people resident in England and Wales were born outside the UK, while the most common 
countries of birth were India, Poland, and Pakistan. Around half of these immigrants had arrived in the UK over 
the previous 10 years. The minority ethnic population (non-White British) has risen steadily over the preceding 
decade18 as shown in Figure 3.2. Net international migration was a major component in this increase. Since the 
1980s, net migration has been positive in most years (meaning more people have entered the UK than left)18. 
iv An ethnic category used for the Census by the Office for National Statistics.
v ‘Second generation’ refers to those born in this country whose parents immigrated into the UK.
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Figure	3.2:	Change	in	ethnic	composition	of	the	population	in	England	and	Wales.
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The share of the population in England and Wales from minority ethnic (non-White British) groups is projected 
to continue to rise over the next decade, and to become more geographically dispersed. Minority ethnic groups, 
concentrated in a few areas in 200177, are projected to become more widely distributed, while the major 
cities are predicted to have much larger minority ethnic populations in the future18. This pattern of increasing 
diversity has an age dimension. Minority ethnic groups are likely on average to have a lower age than the general 
population, as immigrants tend to be younger people, and total fertility rates among non-UK born women are 
higher (as discussed in Section 3.1.1).
Since 2004 there has been a trend towards inward migration from the eight EU Accession countries. Long-term 
international migration estimates for the eight Accession countries suggest that in 2010, net migration into the 
UK was 49,000, 15% of net migration, compared with a peak of 20% in 2007. The Office for National Statistics’ 
Annual Population Survey suggests that in March 2011 there were two million EU citizens living in the UK, and 
872,000, or 42%, of those were from the eight EU Accession countries78. This group seem more likely to live in 
different regions from other minority ethnic immigrants, and less likely to settle permanently. As a group, they 
have a greater proportion of younger people compared with the general population.
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Some commentators are concerned that this trend of increased net inward migration will create social division 
and social tension10. Surveys suggest that about two-thirds of the UK population feel there are ‘too many 
immigrants in Britain’, and that this proportion has remained more or less constant over the past two decades79. 
The 2009 European Values Study found that 69% of UK respondents ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that there 
were too many immigrants living in the country, compared with an average of 44% for all 47 countries in the 
survey80. This is based on a particular view of identity which sees new arrivals of an indigenous community as 
‘other’ and a threat. However, recent research shows a significant and steep decline in levels of prejudice against 
minorities between older and younger generations, which suggests a rise in tolerant attitudes among younger 
people81 and a more positive attitude towards immigrants10 82.
There is some evidence that some social and minority ethnic groups experience very different levels of social 
integration83. Black Caribbean young people tend to have lower levels of a sense of belonging to Britain. In 2005 
the Home Office Citizenship Survey found that, overall, 17% of all 16–24 year olds surveyed from all ethnic 
groups in England said they ‘Do not belong strongly’ to Britain, while for the Black Caribbean/Black Other 
group of 16–24 year olds, 40% said they felt they ‘Do not belong strongly’ to Britain, even if they had been 
born in Britain. However, sample sizes were relatively small (1,394 in total with only 83 in the Black Caribbean/ 
Black Other group)84. Other research has found that this ethnic group has also reported feeling high levels of 
relative deprivation, and felt they were held back unfairly by prejudice and discrimination85 86. The survey also 
showed much less trust in British political institutions and in the way that democracy works16. There is a so-
called ‘integration paradox’, where ethnic minorities, such as the Black Caribbean group, who have relatively high 
levels of contact with the White British majority, are also more acutely aware of and sensitive to prejudice and 
discrimination, while groups that lead more separate lives may actually be less aware of prejudice. There is also 
evidence that minority ethnic people who are more highly educated, and in that sense more integrated, are also 
more aware of and sensitive to discrimination15 87.
3.1.5 Hyper-connectivity 
Hyper-connectivity is the use of multiple communications systems and devices to remain constantly connected 
to social networks and streams of information88. Hyper-connectivity has several key attributes: being ‘always 
on’ (connected all of the time and everywhere); readily accessible; information-rich beyond any individual’s 
capacity to consume; interactive, not only between people but also involving people-to-machine and machine-
to-machine communications; and always recording, with virtually unlimited storage capacity facilitating people’s 
desire to document their lives89. 
This driver is considered one of the key developments of the early 21st century90, enabled by the trend towards 
increasing ubiquity of internet access and the rapid rise between 2009 and 2011 in accessing the internet 
through mobile devices (see Figure 3.3). By 2011 there were more devices connected to the internet than 
there were people in the world, and numbers are predicted to reach 15 billion by 201591. In the UK, 80% of 
households had internet access in 2012, having increased by 23% since 200692. Mobile smart-phones and social 
networking mean that the internet can be pervasive and people can be constantly connected to it.
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Figure	3.3:	How	people	access	the	internet.	
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Source: Oxford Internet Survey 2011, Oxford Internet Institute93.
There is an age-related aspect to hyper-connectivity, with a greater take-up of internet-based communications 
by younger people than older people. In a 2011 survey of 994 British young people aged 16–24, 45% said they 
felt happiest when they were online; 86% felt new technology helps them to communicate with people; and 
96% said they access another media device such as a mobile phone while using the internet94. Increasing digital 
network coverage and higher access speeds will continue to drive this trend, while bringing new opportunities to 
rural communities. However, there remains a significant minority of ‘excluded’ households, both rural and urban, 
who by choice, culture, or circumstances cannot or do not access the internet and who are ‘digitally excluded’. 
There is also a minority of about 10% (aged 17–23) who define themselves as lapsed internet users, often having 
had limited home access and restricted resources (psychological, cognitive, socio-cultural, physical or material)95.
The trend towards hyper-connectivity has the potential to have a positive impact on migrant communities 
in maintaining social connections with family and friends96 97. There is now the capacity for migrants to 
communicate online with people from their natal country, although this could also serve to isolate them 
more from the host society and so impede integration2. Over the next 10 years, dispersed communities will 
increasingly be able to stay in close touch with events in their country of origin. This means that events which 
occur elsewhere in the world can have an immediate impact on people’s identities in the UK98, for example 
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through the transmission of consumer culture, heightened awareness of political events elsewhere, and 
responses to perceived persecution in other countries.
It is difficult to speculate on the likely impact of growing hyper-connectivity. People may find it harder to 
disconnect themselves, or to maintain distinct identities in different situations. One likely development is that 
the increasingly networked state of many people’s lives could blur the boundaries between online and offline 
identities, and between work and social identities. The advent of widespread mobile technology and email has 
led to more people remaining connected to their work during the evenings, weekends and other leisure times. 
In future, this blurring effect could make it harder for businesses to prevent people from maintaining contacts 
outside of the workplace. This breakdown in the barrier between separate identities could be among the most 
important and transformative consequences of social and technological changes2. The scenarios developed for 
this Report illustrate how generational divisions in access to the internet and familiarity with using it may lead to 
tensions (see Box 3.3: Dylan 2014).
Box 3.3: Dylan 2014
These scenarios illustrate how drivers of change may affect 
individuals in different contexts
In 2014, Dylan’s daughter changes jobs to one which enables her to work remotely, and so to save on rent 
costs she moves from London back into her parents’ home in South Wales. She helps Dylan to become more 
familiar with the latest technology, buying him an e-book reader and setting up an email account and social 
networking account for him. Dylan finds he is able to use these while she is there, and is pleased to join the 
local church group’s online followers so he can see what events are going on locally, but he finds it odd to be 
taught by his daughter. Dylan had thought it might be nice to have her back home again, but she often shuts 
herself away in her room to work, or stays out late with her friends, which is a source of tension between them. 
A further source of tension arises when, without checking with his daughter, Dylan responds to an email scam, 
giving his bank account details and is defrauded by several hundred pounds. The incident increases his feelings of 
social distrust and he begins to resent his reliance on his daughter for online matters.
Summary
The trends discussed here suggest that several social changes will affect identities in 
the UK over the next 10 years. However, some changes such as the ageing population, 
secularisation, and diversity, are likely to be very gradual. Demographic trends suggest that 
age categories will become more blurred as people choose to define themselves less by age 
and more by family roles. At the same time, intergenerational relationships could come 
under strain. Young people as ‘digital natives’ could have very different sets of expectations, 
linked to the trend towards hyper-connectivity, which can pose both opportunities and 
challenges for society. 
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3.2 Technological drivers
3.2.1 Online identities
For many people, a substantial proportion of their waking lives is spent online or interacting with the digital 
environment, and ‘Generation Z’ will have known little else99. In recent years social networking has expanded to 
include ‘professional’ networking sites and other forms of expression and exploration such as ‘blogging’, Twitter, 
avatars, gaming, personal web-pages, or membership of various internet discussion groups. Almost every 
online platform is different and potentially contradictory; for example, blogging may be private or public while 
Facebook can be accessible to friends only or open to all. In the case of Twitter, messages can usually be read 
by everyone unless personal messaging is used. Online platforms are changing radically and rapidly; for example, 
online multiplayer gaming is replacing participation by individual gaming. Mobile technologies are playing a 
role in driving change, with new formats and apps being launched to run on smart-phones, while the notion 
of computers as being separate from people is changing, as many now keep their own personal networked 
computer in the form of their smart-phone with them at all times.
The proliferation of communications technologies over a range of platforms can be described as a ‘poly-media’ 
environment100, and people now use different platforms simultaneously or to complement one another101. 
Their identities across online platforms may be broadly similar or may shift in emphasis, for example from a 
professional identity to a social identity, and between media, for example text messaging versus face-to-face 
conversations via a webcam. The poly-media environment requires an individual’s identity to perform different 
functions in a digital networked world19, for example when a person is using an online bank, making purchases 
from an online retail websites, or participating in social media. 
In the early years of widespread internet usage, there were concerns that the internet diminished ‘real’ identity, 
and prevented face-to-face human socialisation, with online identities being seen as very different from those 
in the offline ‘real’ world102. Being online makes it easier for people to explore new forms of identities, such as 
fantasy avatars, and to shift identity or secure multiple identities with relative freedom2. While individuals can 
choose to present themselves in different ways depending on their audience3, these are simply multiple identities 
that are often extensions of offline identities. As people have become accustomed to switching seamlessly 
between the internet and the physical world, they have begun to use social media to pursue friendships, continue 
conversations, and make arrangements in a way which dissolves the divide between online and offline. The 
internet does not produce a new kind of identity4, but has instead been instrumental in raising awareness that 
identities were more multiple, culturally contingent and contextual than had previously been fully appreciated2. 
People can also control their online identities, for example by using avatars to represent their identities online, 
and project themselves in ways of their choosing (see Figure 3.4). There has been a general trend away from 
‘fantasy’ identities, such as those used in multiplayer games3, with more people using online identities that are 
fairly accurate representations of themselves103, as seen in Figure 3.4 with Kimberly Rufer-Bach and her avatar 
‘Kim Anubis’. However manipulation of online identities can be an effective tool, as seen with Choi Seang Rak 
and his avatar ‘Uroo Ahs’ (Figure 3.4).
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Figure	3.4:	People	and	their	online	avatars.
Photographs of people alongside their online avatars with details of each person and edited highlights of interviews with them, 
illustrating how people can use avatars to represent themselves accurately or can choose be seen as someone else. For a 
disabled person, an avatar can enable them to interact online without being judged by their appearance.
Name: Choi Seang Rak
Born: 1971
Occupation: Academic
Location: Seoul, South Korea
Average	hours	per	week	in-game: 8
Avatar	name: Uroo Ahs
Avatar	created: 2004
Game	played: Lineage II
“I’m a professor. I teach economics 
and public policy at the Dongguk 
University in Seoul…My teaching duties 
don’t leave me much time to play 
but my avatar is logged in 24 hours 
a day, seven days a week. She sits in 
the marketplace, buying and selling 
items while I’m away at work…People 
buy more from my little girl dwarf 
compared to the old male dwarf I used 
to have, even though they sell the same 
things. Because I’m very polite, people 
think I really am a little girl.”
Name: Kimberly Rufer-Bach
Born: 1966
Occupation: Software developer
Location: San José, California, USA
Average	hours	per	week	in-game: 70
Avatar	name: Kim Anubis
Avatar	created: 2004
Game	played: Second Life
“I’m forty years old and have two cats 
and five computers…Most of the time 
my avatar looks like my real self, but 
about twenty years younger. I’m jealous 
of some of her clothes. I made a pair 
of boots that I wish I could export into 
real life. I usually dress my avatar in the 
same sort of stuff I wear. She doesn’t 
have a separate persona or anything. 
She’s just an extension of myself in this 
virtual space.”
Name: Jason Rowe
Born: 1975
Occupation: None
Location: Crosby, Texas, USA
Average	hours	per	week	in-game: 80
Avatar	name: Rurouni Kenshin
Avatar	created: 2003
Game	played: Star Wars Galaxies
“The difference between me and my 
online character is pretty obvious. I 
have a lot of physical disabilities in real 
life, but in Star Wars Galaxies I can ride 
an Imperial speeder bike, fight monsters, 
or just hang out with friends at a bar… 
I play online games because I get to 
interact with people. The computer 
screen is my window to the world. 
Online it doesn’t matter what you look 
like. Virtual worlds bring people together 
– everyone is on common ground. In the 
real world, people can be uncomfortable 
around me before they get to know me 
and realize that, apart from my outer 
appearance, I’m just like them.”
Source: Robbie Cooper, Alter Ego: Avatars and their creators104.
Edited by Foresight.
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One of the most significant observations of the impact of online identities is that some individuals feel they 
have only achieved their ‘true’ identity for first time online105. For example, for individuals with various forms of 
disability106, such as autism and muscular dystrophy, being online or having an avatar can be the first time the 
person feels they are seen by others as a ‘normal’ human being2. In Figure 3.4, the interview with Jason Rowe 
contrasts his disability with his superhero avatar Rurouni Kenshin, showing how gaming online enables Jason to 
socialise on an equal footing with others. The internet can allow many types of people to realise their identities 
more fully; for example, some people who have been shy or lonely or feel less attractive discover they can 
socialise more successfully and express themselves more freely online2. This may be one of the main ways in 
which online identities can transform offline identities.
The internet makes it possible to create fake online identities107, but these are often over-hyped by the media2. 
Social media sites do outlaw any deliberate deception as part of their terms and conditions, and they are also 
self-regulating to some extent, in that individuals are likely to connect to acquaintances and friends that they 
also know offline3. Fake identities may be less common than is often assumed19. Facebook recently revealed 
that it had 83 million fake accounts, 8.7% of the total, but the majority were considered to be duplicates or 
misclassified rather than ‘undesirable’ accounts, which made up only 1.5% of the total108. Some fake accounts 
may be created for perfectly legitimate reasons, such as individuals seeking anonymity to protect themselves 
from unwanted intrusion, to divide their work and social lives, or because they are required to have a unique 
username109. This does not mean that they are pretending to be a different person, or necessarily have any 
criminal intentions110. Of course, fake identities can also be created in order to perpetrate a crime111. However, 
over the next 10 years, technologies including facial recognition and other means of tracking digital ‘footprints’ 
may reduce the potential for fake identities to remain undiscovered. Some platforms now routinely link 
information, for example cross-posting content between social media accounts, so that inconsistencies may be 
more easily identified1. Possible developments in cybercrime are discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.4 below.
3.2.2 Social media
Social media differs from traditional communications technologies in that, being online, it allows users to create, 
share, consume, and collaborate on content in new ways3. The use of online social media has surged in recent 
years, becoming a majority activity since 200993. Usage was initially spurred by young people but social media 
is now used by most people in the UK. In 2011, 60% of internet users in the UK were members of a social 
network site, an increase of 43% from 200793. Over the next 10 years, the nature of online platforms can be 
expected to change radically2. Control of online identities will become increasingly important and will highlight 
issues such as the ownership and use of personal content and privacy.
Evidence shows that younger people between the ages of 8 and 18 are generally less concerned with their 
privacy than older people and are more willing to share information online112. However, their levels of awareness 
of online security and the potential risks of sharing personal information, its longevity on the internet, and who 
might access it, are variable. The rules governing the possession of digital information are dramatically different 
from those of offline possession113. For example, once an image has been posted online, it could be retained by  
the website (depending on its terms and conditions) or others could reproduce, share, adapt or use it in ways 
which could be unwelcome to the original owner1. An online personal history cannot be completely erased 
but serves as a permanent autobiography. This means that care needs to be taken when sharing personal 
information online, with an awareness of how that information may be retained or used by others, including 
in the future. 
Social networking websites have been associated with a loss of anonymity and also perceived as a threat to 
privacy. People’s apparent willingness to disclose information in exchange for access to services (for example 
social network sites, free Wi-Fi, coupons) combined with the financial value to be gained from exploiting 
customer data (such as mobile phone providers developing data analytics) leads people to cede control over 
what happens to their data online more readily than in the past. Even people who do not choose to have an 
online presence may be identified online, for example through ‘tagging’ in photos online. This trend can be 
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expected to continue over the next 10 years3. The implications are that people may no longer be the primary 
creators of their own online identities, with implications for their offline identities, as online and offline identities 
are converging4. 
It is hard to predict precisely how social media might develop over the next 10 years, as the internet changes 
rapidly and people’s preferred websites alter. There may be more political activism using social media 
(‘clicktivism’2), as these networks become more influential in ‘spreading the message’ and allowing instant 
feedback and commentary. Social media can facilitate political movements. In some cases this usage has been 
thought to be very influential, for example in the revolution in Tunisia in 2011 and in mobilising dissent in Egypt 
and Libya, or at the very least has raised the international profile of these events. However, some dispute the 
extent of its influence in these examples114.
Social media can facilitate links between like-minded individuals to create niche communities of interest, which 
could be benign or malign2, and may reinforce existing behaviours, normalise minority identities, and broaden 
choices4. The persistence of digital data will also have implications as young people grow into adulthood, 
seek employment and progress in their careers3, because information could become potentially available to 
unintended audiences. Social media sites can conflate work and social identities within the same online space 
and lead to information leaking from one sphere to another. The scenarios developed for this Report explore 
this issue using the example of Esther, who finds that information available about her has had consequences in 
the workplace (Box 3.4: Esther 2014).
Box 3.4: Esther 2014
These scenarios illustrate how drivers of change may affect 
individuals in different contexts
During 2014, a series of events lead to Esther deciding to move to Scotland. Although her employer in Leeds 
encouraged working from home for senior staff during the London 2012 Olympics, Esther’s role requires her 
to remain based in the office and she finds the daily commute into Leeds city centre tiring. She applies for 
promotion at the bank but is unsuccessful. A colleague tells her that this was because a manager had checked 
her online presence and discovered some drunken photos of Esther from her university days which her 
friends had posted and tagged her in. Frustrated with her situation, Esther decides to pursue her interest in 
art history and enrols on a postgraduate course beginning in autumn 2014. She leaves her parents’ home and 
moves to Glasgow, an emerging hub for art and culture, to study, hoping to pursue her ambition of becoming a 
professional artist.
3.2.3 ‘Big data’
Over the next 10 years it is likely that the ability to aggregate and ‘mine’ large data sets will become even more 
widely used for a variety of purposes, for example to gain a better understanding of consumer preferences, 
and to provide more personalised products and services115. Individual preferences and behaviours are already 
being used to market corresponding products and services, even in real time, and to incorporate location-based 
information. This type of personalisation captures behavioural information from everyday transactions and builds 
them into an overall consumer profile4. These systems can be automated, drawing data directly from machines 
such as smart meters and tags, and can handle very large amounts of data. 
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Governments may be able to utilise ‘big data’ to provide improved public services by sharing information, but 
public responses to this possibility are mixed. The 2010 Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust State of the Nation 
Survey asked people for their perceptions of government use of data sets. Its results showed that 65% thought 
that government proposals to collect and store information are either a ‘Bad’ or ‘Very bad’ idea, while a total of 
83% were against allowing the government to access phone, email and browsing records116 (see Table 3.2). Using 
‘big data’ is also a logistical and technical challenge, because the vast quantity of content on the internet means 
locating relevant information and verifying its accuracy become problematic. 
Table	3.2:	Joseph	Rowntree	Reform	Trust	State	of	the	Nation	Survey	results	from	the	question	‘From	what	you	
have	seen	or	heard	do	you	think	the	following	government	proposals	for	handling	personal	information	are	a	
good	or	bad	idea?’.	
Very 
good 
idea
Good 
idea 
Bad 
idea 
Very 
bad 
idea
Don’t 
know 
Collecting information about citizens and storing it on large 
computer systems which can then be used for a wide range of 
purposes and shared between different parts of government
% 6 22 31 34 7
Holding all your medical records on a centralised computer 
system, rather than under the control of your GP or hospital
% 13 26 26 29 6
Allowing the government to be able access your phone, email 
and internet browsing records wherever they are held
% 3 9 28 55 5
Source: Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust116. 
Increased use of mobile technology, such as smart-phones and tablets, allows social media ‘rich’ information to 
be linked with spatial tracking and even facial recognition technologies, and for people’s locations, preferences 
and personal information to be broadcast to others. This means that, increasingly, people will be able to draw 
on personal information about a stranger in a public place, over time changing the nature of what it will mean 
to be anonymous in public spaces3. Some apps now offer the possibility of using a smart-phone to photograph 
individuals and access online public profiles in real time4. 
The proliferation, synthesis, and exploitation of ‘big data’ sets by the private sector raises questions over who 
‘owns’ and can access the data, with implications for personal privacy and liberty1. Individuals will be more 
easily identified through triangulating data from multiple anonymised data sets, each giving an additional piece 
of information, potentially reducing privacy. Digital information is already a commodity which can be traded, 
sometimes without the consent or even knowledge of the individual. The growing value of digital information 
has started to attract increasing criminal attention, such as for use in identity fraud19, while there are concerns 
over private sector use or misuse of this data. This could cause some people to withdraw from the digital 
environment, or reduce their trust in online transactions, as the scenario for Esther shows (Box 3.5: Esther 2016).
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Box 3.5: Esther 2016
These scenarios illustrate how drivers of change may affect 
individuals in different contexts
Around 2016, a series of high profile cases of large-scale data leaking, theft, and misuse brings data protection 
issues to the fore and the media begin to run a series of high-profile national stories highlighting the security 
concerns. A major law suit against a private sector company over their perceived misuse of personal data 
follows. Many people seek to reclaim control of their personal data, with an online protest movement 
campaigning for greater online privacy gaining a large following. An early success for them is the strict regulation 
of electrical ‘smart meters’. These issues affect Esther’s parents directly, as they become victims of identity theft 
and their details are used to forge a fake driving licence. Esther initially reacts by removing her details from 
online sites, but over time she misses her online social interactions and feels the need to be connected to the 
internet to build her reputation as an artist and to sell her work online, and so rejoins. However she is now 
cautious about sharing personal information and carefully manages her online identity.
3.2.4 Cybercrime
There is a distinction to be made between a traditional type of crime that is now committed using a computer, 
and a crime wholly enabled by the internet. ‘Identity theft’ is used to refer to a range of criminal behaviours; for 
example, whether what is stolen is an ‘identifier’ (such as a reference number is or a PIN) or information that 
enables someone to impersonate another20. The theft of aspects of someone’s identity can be used for a range 
of criminal purposes, from gaining a false passport to committing fraud. Identity fraud uses personal information 
about a victim’s personal or organisational identity to exploit existing trust in their identity, or to pretend to be 
that person to obtain resources fraudulently from another organisation. To gain access to the victim, criminals also 
often exploit the social capital invested in the trusted identities of individuals, groups or organisations to deceive 
others, typically pretending to be someone else to perpetrate a scam, for example through ‘cold calling’20. 
Because so much personal, consumer, and financial information is now online, the internet has become a 
valuable resource for criminal behaviour enabling identity theft, fraud, and the facilitation of terrorism117. 
Technology has enabled a range of new methods to achieve fraud at a global level. These include phishing, 
pharming, Domain Name System (DNS) poisoning (attacks on a domain name, for example to insert a fake 
address record) and spoof emails that contain links to bogus websites, or which install spyware to log keystrokes 
or seek out financial information stored on the computer’s hard drive. More recent developments exploit the 
new converged mobile technologies, such as ‘smishing’, which involves sending victims SMS text messages that, 
as in the original phishing emails, seek to obtain ‘important security information’. Finally, there is ‘vishing’, which 
exploits VOIP (voice over internet protocol) in the same way. Victims are tricked into ringing back the number 
given or logging onto a web address given in the message20. 
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Although it is extremely difficult to quantify the cost or incidence of cybercrime118, a 2010 Eurostat ICT survey 
of online usage and concerns over internet crime across all 27 EU countries showed that 80% of the UK’s 
population used the internet regularly (at least once a week) and 66% frequently (every day or almost every 
day)119. When the survey looked at self-reported actual experience of cybercrime over the previous 12 months 
among internet users, the UK broadly matches the EU average for virus infections, privacy violations, and spam 
(54% of those surveyed in the UK had received spam emails); however the UK ranked second out of 27 (behind 
Latvia) for experiences of financial losses caused by phishing and pharming attacks and payment card fraud, 
affecting 7% of the UK’s online population119.
Cybercrime has both direct and indirect costs, affecting millions of individuals, the private sector, and the 
government1 20. Banks, business and organisations spend substantial sums each year responding to fraud, 
repairing losses, and trying to prevent identity fraud. However it is important that the occurrence of cybercrime 
and identity-related crime is not overstated19. The Scottish Crime and Justice Survey showed that many more 
people fear becoming a victim of identity crime than actually experience it121. However fear of crime itself can 
have an impact on an individual’s sense of safety and consequent behaviour. Identity theft is more than simply 
a manifestation of crime, because it uses part of an individual’s sense of self and so is particularly disruptive and 
invasive for a victim. 
Creating false identities can be a component of cybercrime, for example to perpetrate a fraud, conduct 
espionage, or evade capture. Creating a false identity, or stealing another person’s identity (‘identity theft’), is 
often achieved through obtaining key personal information such as PINs, addresses and passwords that enable 
a person to verify their identity for organisations such as their bank. This means that the distinction between 
a person’s ‘identity’ (in terms of their overall coherent sense of self ) and the identification used to distinguish 
between people online is being increasingly blurred in practice, as identifiers become proxies for ‘real’ identities. 
Someone attempting to conceal themself or cover their tracks over a long period of time could seek to obtain 
some kind of false identity documentation to support their false identity. The internet can help people to 
obtain fake documentation, for example by providing access to the personal details of individuals and to other 
relevant information which could assist in identity theft122. Another method is to try and acquire genuine 
documentation under an assumed identity, as a false identity which is based on genuine identity documents is 
difficult to detect19. Increasing global migration suggests there may be a rise in incidents of fraudulently obtained 
identity documents being unwittingly accepted as genuine, and in difficulties in verifying identity documentations 
issued by other countries. If online identities become more securely validated, there is the prospect that these 
‘offline’ options will be at a greater premium to criminals. New technology such as mining large data sets, 
cross-referencing a range of personal and other information, or tracking inconsistencies in online behaviour, 
for example, may be able to detect fraudulent online identities in some cases, but a false identity might also 
be uncovered through family and social networks123. 
Over the next 10 years, as the distinction between online and offline identities diminishes, criminals are likely 
to try to exploit the many new forms of interlinked data relating to people’s identities from social media and 
from financial and professional websites, in order to construct fake identities or steal real identities which could 
withstand more sophisticated interrogation. Ultimately, stealing sufficient information could enable criminals to 
effectively take over their victims’ online identities19. Reputation will therefore become increasingly important for 
building trust between individuals online, in an environment where instances of blackmail and extortion have the 
potential to rise over the next 10 years as people threaten to reveal personal information and destroy reputations.
While it may become more difficult to fabricate new identities in future19, because the chances for discovery 
through social media networks, facial recognition technology, and ‘big data’ analytics will be higher, there is a 
technological inevitability that as one form of crime is brought under control, new forms of identity theft and 
fraud will develop to take their place. Identity-related crimes will never be eradicated, but they can be managed 
by using various prevention and detection strategies118.
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3.2.5 Biomedical technologies
In the next 10 years, it is likely that there will be advances in the development of biomedical technologies which 
may extend the boundaries of how people perceive themselves and others, and may therefore affect their 
identities1. Interventions to slow the effects of ageing and improve quality of life for the elderly, drugs to improve 
memory and cognition124, developments in reproductive technologies, cloning, animal/human organ transplants, 
and genetic modification are also likely to have implications for identities125. 
Some of these developments may challenge notions of what it is to be human, as interfaces between humans 
and machines are also being explored in new ways. One example is neuroprosthetic devices, such as retinal 
implants to restore vision. Computers are also being developed that can track movements of users’ bodies and 
eyes and react accordingly, without specific commands having to be given. Prostheses in the form of artificial 
extensions to limbs can now be electronically operated, and can incorporate new mechanical designs such as 
the running blades used in the London 2012 Paralympics. A few scientists have experimented with implanting 
computer chips into their bodies to control devices and their ‘smart’ environment. In one example, a scientist 
infected his biochip with a computer virus to demonstrate the ability to foil security systems126. Robotics and 
artificial intelligence may go even further in blurring the lines between human and machine.
Technologies are being developed in the neurosciences and in forensic science which have the potential to 
impinge on people’s identities and individual privacy. These aim to increase our understanding of the human 
brain and to interpret patterns of thinking. Some are proving controversial, such as ‘brain fingerprinting’, 
which uses electroencephalography (EEG) as a method of lie detection127. This technology measures electrical 
brainwave responses to words or pictures presented on a computer screen with a view to seeing what is 
recognised and potentially to detect a person who might be lying128 129 although there is scepticism about 
whether this technique reliably measures what is claimed130. If these technologies become more reliable and 
accepted in courts as evidence, there are implications for personal identities as thoughts and intentions may 
no longer be private.
Summary
Technological trends could be transformative for some aspects of identities over the next 
decade. Already the distinction between offline and online identities is becoming irrelevant 
as the digital divide recedes. Over the next 10 years the take-up of social media is likely 
to increase even further, and this will enable people to express different aspects of their 
identities. However, maintaining an online presence could become normalised to the point 
where refusing to participate in online media could appear unusual or even suspicious. 
People may also find increasingly that their online identities are created or mediated 
by others.
The persistence and availability of data on the internet means that social and biographical 
identities will become synthesised to a much greater degree across social and professional 
spheres. Private lives are likely to become more public, especially among younger people 
who have a more open attitude to their personal privacy. Aspects of online identities 
are being ‘fixed’ in time and could be available to unintended audiences, with potential 
consequences for future lives and careers.
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3.3 Economic drivers
3.3.1 Consumerism
A consumer society considers consumption a route to personal happiness and enjoyment of life131, and products 
and services therefore become part of the construction and expression of identities and status11. Identities 
can be expressed through many types of consumption. Consumption and investments are not just economic 
decisions, but become social and political decisions invested with moral significance132, so for example being able 
to verify the ethical practices of a business serves as a basis of trust towards a brand identity11. 
Choices over food and drink are one way in which some people express their identities, as in the case of 
vegans, consumers of organic produce, and dieters who conform to a particular diet plan133. In 2007, research 
into friendship groups among 18–25 year olds found that alcohol consumption was an important element 
in the construction of young people’s social lives and their friendship groups, where drinking was a form of 
performance that carried its own pleasures, excitement, risks and anxieties, and through which a range of 
possible selves could be acted out134.
Consumerism is therefore an important way in which identities are explored and projected to others. A 
consumer society also leads to a close interrelationship between expressing identities through material culture, 
and the manipulation of identities by branding and advertising aimed towards particular groups, such as 
marketing to teenagers135. 
The prolonged economic crisis and growing socio-economic inequality is likely to stimulate the emergence of 
new alternative anti-consumerist movements, some with global resonances, such as the Occupy movement136, 
whose antagonism towards the very wealthy elite may become more widespread12. Overall, their impact on 
wider society is likely to remain modest over the next decade7. However, growing awareness of social and 
economic inequalities will create insecurity and uncertainty, and could ultimately lead to a tipping point where 
class identities strengthen and become more politicised. The scenarios developed for this Report explore this 
trend through the example of Dylan, suggesting that in his case wider social unrest has little impact compared to 
pressing local issues and his Welsh identity (see Box 3.6: Dylan 2016).
Box 3.6: Dylan 2016
These scenarios illustrate how drivers of change may affect 
individuals in different contexts
In 2016 there are small-scale riots in Cardiff over cuts to services and welfare provision. Although Dylan did 
not participate, thinking mistakenly that the rioters were primarily immigrants receiving more than their fair 
share, the issue of cuts, and in particular the closure of his local hospital, remained very important to him. 
He is concerned about his elderly mother’s deteriorating condition, as well as his wife’s and his own growing 
health concerns. His back has been hurting a lot lately and he has had to take a number of sick days off from 
work due to back pain. Politically, Dylan is unsympathetic towards the Welsh nationalists, who had risen to 
prominence, as he had always been an ardent Welsh Labour supporter. He is critical of UK economic policy 
and longs for the return of local traditional industries.
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3.3.2 Economic downturn
Changes in the economic climate over the next 10 years may be expected to have a major impact on socio-
economic categories, or class status7. However it is difficult to measure the effect of socio-economic trends in 
past decades on identities137, so projecting the effect over the next 10 years is equally problematic. While class 
structures in Britain have often been viewed as having become less important over the past 40 years138, analysis 
of the trends shown in the British Election Surveys since 1974 compared with the 2005 British Social Attitudes 
Survey suggest there has been relative stability. In 1974, 35% of people surveyed (sample size 2,329) said they 
were middle class, 63% working class, and 4% did not identify with any class; while in 2005, 37% of respondents 
said they were middle class, 57% working class, and 6% did not identify with any class139. The main change since 
the 1970s may therefore be a decline in the number of people considering themselves ‘working class’, perhaps 
to be expected given rising incomes over this period and changes to the labour market. Thanks to wider social 
changes, class identities are no longer seen as ascribed from birth, but instead describe an individual’s view of 
themself based on personal history, mobility between class positions, and cultural stereotypes140. Class, as such, 
may therefore no longer be linked to economic position as strongly as was the case in the past. Many people in 
the UK now see themselves as middle income12, and share a group identity with the hard-working masses, or 
the ‘squeezed middle,’ even if that does not accurately reflect their income relative to the average. 
The economic downturn may have repercussions for identities in terms of financial status, potentially giving 
rise to greater social and economic polarisation between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. There has been a widely 
observed trend that the incomes and assets of the UK’s very wealthy have grown much more rapidly than those 
of the rest of the working population. Analysis of different income groups shows that since the late 1970s, the 
top 10% have increased their income share by half, with the top 1% doubling and the top 0.1% tripling their 
shares141. Figure 3.5 shows the trend in income inequality over the past four decades for the 95th income centile 
compared with the 10th centile, showing how the gap between richer and poorer groups has widened. Income 
inequality increased during the 1980s, during a period of economic growth, and broadly levelled off at a higher 
level of income inequality, a pattern reflected in analyses using the Gini coefficientvi, a widely used measure of 
income inequality142. 
Spatial inequalities in income and wealth have also grown markedly since the 1970s: average incomes are lower 
in the North, the Midlands and some parts of Wales and in the poorer areas of large cities144 and poverty 
(defined as earning less than 60% of median income145) has become increasingly concentrated in these areas146. 
The rising costs of living – energy, fuel, housing, and food costs – affect everyone, but fall disproportionately on 
low-income households.
vi The Gini coefficient is used to show the degree of income inequality between different groups of households in the population, by condensing the 
entire income distribution into a single number between 0 and 1. The lower its value, the more equally household income is distributed.
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Figure	3.5:	Income	after	housing	costs	for	very	high	and	low	earners	compared	with	the	median	50th	centile	
income	group.	
Income ratio (after housing costs)
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Research on inequality in different countries shows that more unequal societies are less integrated, have lower 
levels of trust147, and have higher levels of crime, disorder and protest148. The economic downturn will tend to 
make divisions in living standards and in opportunities more obvious12 and this may foster resentment, as some 
people become more excluded. This in turn would lead to lower levels of civic participation and engagement. 
Poorer people could feel abandoned or victimised by the state, and have a growing sense of alienation from 
mainstream society which, in turn, may become less sympathetic to the poor and unemployed12. It is likely 
that the alienation that some people in the UK feel towards the EU may grow, while social unrest, heightened 
xenophobia and prejudice towards immigrants by some groups is likely to increase11. Marginalisation could 
produce social unrest, while tensions between underprivileged groups and the police can create potentially 
violent disorder10, as occurred during the UK riots in August 201118. Inequality is likely to continue to present 
important challenges for policy makers by undermining social integration and social mobility148 149 150. Policies 
which support inclusion and rebuild social capital11, emphasise fairness, and avoid widening group differences, 
will continue to be important in mitigating potentially negative outcomes.
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Since at least 1990, there has been in the UK a pattern of continuing decline in employment for skilled and 
semi-skilled manual roles, including skilled trade occupations and process, plant and machinery operatives, while 
there has been growth in higher skilled professional occupations. These trends are projected to continue to at 
least 2020151. According to an EU-wide public opinion survey on citizenship and belonging, work was rated as 
one of the three most important elements of 39% of EU citizens’ lives152. As a large part of people’s lives are 
spent working, careers affect both the ability of people to make choices and their self-esteem. The modern 
importance of work and career can explain much of human need for recognition, and can become a crucial 
part of an individual’s identity153. While the majority of people who kept their jobs in the recent recession may 
benefit as the economic recovery gets underway in the next few years, there is a real risk that people who 
lost their jobs may experience long-term effects, with important implications for their identities and sense of 
social inclusion11. They may suffer career, health, and psychological consequences which make them feel more 
alienated, disadvantaged, or disengaged. People can feel included or excluded from groups according to their 
status and their economic place in society, through employment, access to networks, and opportunities. In the 
scenarios developed for this Report, Esther’s experiences reflect these anxieties (see Box 3.7: Esther 2019).
Box 3.7: Esther 2019
These scenarios illustrate how drivers of change may affect 
individuals in different contexts
By 2019, the economy is growing again and there are more jobs around. However, despite the economic 
turnaround, Esther, having completed her postgraduate qualification, remains burdened with debt. Although she 
had part-funded her study through poorly paid temporary jobs when she first moved to Glasgow, she still has 
university debts and dreams of saving for a deposit to buy a flat seem a long way off. Now aged 30, and living 
with a partner, Esther dreams of a comfortable life, one where they don’t have to watch every penny. She might 
have thought about having children but can’t see how they can afford to. She worries about her parents getting 
older and she finds it a challenge to keep in regular contact with them. Her own life is busy with work, friends 
and her partner, and when her parents send her text messages, she means to reply but often forgets.
The unequal impact of the recession (and unequal recovery from the recession) may have implications for 
constitutional preferences in Wales and Scotland. The perception that England has suffered less from the 
recession than other nations may increase the likelihood of demands for greater independence. The major 
challenge will be to ensure that the austerity measures are not perceived to affect some areas more deeply  
than others. One risk is that perceptions may depend on what is seen to be occurring in London, the seat  
of government, rather than in the UK as a whole8. It will continue to be important for the economic benefits  
of recovery to be spread fairly around the UK, and across generations. 
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Summary
Over the next decade economic trends will have a considerable impact on people’s identities, 
while the broader effects may also have indirect impacts. Consumerism is an important way 
in which people currently express their identity. If current trends continue, the effects of 
the economic downturn in the UK may increase pressures on many people, threatening 
aspects of their identities relating to, for example, their financial and employment status. 
Income inequality in the UK increased during the 1980s, and in the future economic growth 
will occur more quickly for some than for others; this has the potential to create the conditions 
for further instances of social unrest. The recession may have long-term effects for those 
who lost their jobs or were unable to find work, in both their careers and their health.
3.4 Environmental drivers
3.4.1 Place attachment
People have strong attachments to places (local, regional and national) which become part of who they are, and 
where they feel comfortable and relaxed, and able to be themselves. For example, an individual may describe 
themselves as ‘a local person’. This can be said to be ‘place attachment’. Evidence suggests that people with strong 
attachment to place express higher life satisfaction than those with weak place attachment. People’s attachments 
to particular places are rooted in a sense of security and belonging154. Even in a globalised, modern, urbanised 
society, this sense of attachment is no less important155 156. People can have many attachments to different places157.
The Report noted earlier how the distinction between online and offline identities is receding. This means 
that some people also become part of ‘virtual’ communities158, or communities of interest, rather than their 
neighbourhoods159, and so feel less attachment to their physical locality160. However, the physical environment 
remains important to many people and groups, and this is unlikely to change substantially in the next 10 years. 
New opportunities will emerge from the ‘intelligent’ or smart environment (a place that has been enriched 
with technologies such as sensors and other networked devices to enhance the services that it can provide to 
humans161), which may lead to even closer identity relationships with place3. 
A significant driver of change for place identities is likely to be the various energy transitions needed to move 
UK society towards a low-carbon economy while also maintaining energy security162. This will continue to pose 
considerable challenges including those of changing consumer behaviour to reduce energy consumption, and 
building new infrastructure, which could affect people’s attachment to place. The Government’s Renewable 
Energy Directive sets a target for the UK to achieve 15% of its energy consumption from renewable sources by 
2020, compared with 3% in 2009163. New and upgraded infrastructure will be needed to move the UK towards 
a low-carbon economy, which could pose a threat to valued local places, communities and landscapes164. In the 
context of large infrastructure developments, some environmentally related identities may be strengthened by 
the presence or prospect of new energy facilities, while others will be severely undermined17. People are willing 
to protect places that form part of their identities165, so changes to valued places, such as natural landscapes, can 
lead to local communities mobilising themselves in opposition, and even to broader social protest. 
3.4.2 The built environment
Environmental and place-based changes in the UK over the next 10 years may have a considerable impact on 
notions of identity. Some environments, especially green spaces, have been found to be ‘restorative’, providing 
an increased sense of wellbeing166. It is estimated that each year well over half the UK population, 33 million 
people, make more than 2.5 billion visits to urban green spaces alone167. However access to green spaces, 
especially in urban environments, can be limited for some groups of people. Areas where 40% of the population 
are from Black and minority ethnic groups, compared to areas where just 2% are from such groups168. Changes 
in these environments can be expected to have negative impacts on place identities and wellbeing6. 
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The connection between identities and place is also potentially significant for community engagement and 
citizenship159. Public spaces, for example, are open to all, regardless of ethnic origin, age or gender. These spaces 
influence the cultural identity of an area, are part of its unique character and provide a sense of place for local 
communities169. Changes to the built environment can therefore be expected to have both positive and negative 
impacts on place identities and wellbeing6 10.
The quality, quantity and affordability of housing are crucial factors in people’s place attachment to their homes, 
their sense of belonging, and their sense of attachment to local places. However recent trends in the UK have 
shown house prices rising beyond the reach of many and declining provision of social housing. This has led to 
a segmentation of the housing system between owner-occupiers and rental markets, and between different 
regions170. The number of owner-occupied households has continued to decrease, from the peak of 14.8 million 
in 2005 to 14.5 million in 2011, while during the same period the number of private rented households rose to 
3.6 million in 2011 from 2.5 million in 2005170. In 2011 the percentage of tenants in the social housing sector was 
highest in London and the North East170, where disadvantaged households are often living alongside wealthier areas.
The problems of deprived areas can also have impact on people’s identities. The 2010/11 English Housing Survey 
Household Report showed that households living in poverty are more likely to live in homes that have significant 
outstanding repairs and damp problems than more affluent households, in both the private and social housing 
sectors170. Housing and neighbourhood conditions also influence the residential location decisions of those 
with a choice about where to live171, suggesting that those with sufficient finance will seek out more affluent 
areas. Recent research modelled the effects of three of the Government’s proposed changes to Local Housing 
Allowance rates in London, suggesting that low-income private tenants will be less likely to be able to secure 
accommodation in some more affluent areas172, forcing this section of society to cheaper parts of the outer 
and peripheral areas of London. These areas have relatively high rates of deprivation and unemployment. This 
suggests that people’s sense of belonging and ‘place identities’ will be influenced at least to some extent by the 
broader environment and circumstances in which they live.
Segregation can also be undertaken deliberately, to form ‘safe’ areas, like-minded communities, or to exclude 
undesirables. Places such as some shopping malls and gated communities are part of a trend towards privatising 
spaces. It is estimated that there are around 1,000 gated communities in England173, principally retirement 
communities, reflecting the ageing population trend and the decline in extended family support networks174. 
While not a new phenomenon, they are a physical manifestation of increased (and increasing) social inequality. 
They could be perceived as a ‘force for exclusion’173 and can also signal the privatising of space that was once 
in the public realm174. It could be argued that this increasing segregation of social classes could reduce empathy 
for inequality and social problems173. Gated communities are often protected with networks of closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) surveillance or other security provision, which enforce a use of previously public space 
dominated by individual interests rather than the civic good, where those judged to be unacceptable are 
excluded175 176. A gated community may have a strong sense of community identity, but potentially at the 
cost of wider social exclusion.
3.4.3 Environmental change and risk
This section briefly considers the impact on people’s identities arising from mitigation of environmental changes 
such as flooding, heat waves and droughts6 (see Table 3.3). The first UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 
(CCRA) published in 2012 identifies some of the most important risks and opportunities that climate change 
may present to the UK, showing that the UK is already vulnerable to extreme weather, including flooding and 
heat waves, while flood risk is projected to increase significantly across the UK over the next decades177. The 
impact of increased temperatures is a key issue for the longer-term. In the UK in particular, there is a strong 
perception that this is a cold, wet climate, and a concomitant reluctance to address any need for protection 
against alternative extremes of weather such as heat waves and drought178. Some research suggests that resilience 
among older people (‘coping’ rather than complaining) could lead to the denial of excessive heat as a risk, with 
potentially adverse consequences6. So while many of these changes will occur over a much longer period than  
is considered in this report, behaviours will need to start to change now to avoid the most serious impacts6.
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Table	3.3:	Scenarios	for	UK	Climate	Projections:	middle	estimate.
Impact to 2010 baseline Consequence Confidence
Mental	health	due	to	
effect	of	floods/storms
3,500–4,500 people in England 
and Wales suffer a mental 
health effect due to flooding 
each year – this is 30–40% 
of those who are flooded 
each year.
The numbers of additional people 
in England and Wales affected per 
year according to this metric are 
estimated to be 3,000–4,000 by 
2020s, 4,000–7,000 by the 2050s 
and 5,000–8,000 by the 2080s. 
The high number estimated 
for 2020s is due in part to the 
considerable number of properties, 
particularly in regions around the 
River Humber, where a small change 
in risk may result in a noticeable 
change in risk of flooding. 
Medium
Summer	mortality	due	
to	higher	temperatures	
Approximately 1,100 premature 
deaths in the UK due to higher 
temperatures.
Results from the CCRA indicate an 
increase for the medium emissions 
central estimate of approximately 
60% in heat-related mortality in 
the near-term (2020s), with an 
approximate 200% increase in the 
medium-term (2050s). 
High
Summer	morbidity	due	
to	higher	temperatures	
Estimate of approximately 
100,000 hospital admissions 
due to heat each year.
This is likely to result in an 
approximate 60% increase in 
heat-related morbidity in the near-
term (2020s), with an approximate 
200% increase in the medium-term 
(2050s), based on central estimates 
for the medium emissions scenario. 
High
Vulnerable	people	
at	significant	risk	of	
flooding	(vulnerability	is	
assessed	using	the	index	
of	multiple	deprivation)
Estimate of approximately 
70,000 of the properties in 
the ‘most deprived’ areas are 
currently at significant risk of 
flooding.
A twofold (~1.5 to 2.8 times) 
increase in the number of 
properties at risk for the 2020s is 
predicted. 
Medium
Number	of	people	at	
significant	risk	of	tidal	
or	river	flooding
Estimated number of people at 
significant likelihood of flooding 
currently is 900,000 in the UK.
It is projected to range from about 
1.1 to 2 million in the 2020s, rising 
to1.7 to 2.6 million by the 2050s.
High
Extreme	weather	event	
(flooding	and	storms)	
mortality
Approximately 18 flood-
related deaths per year. 
The overall findings suggest 
an increase in fatalities of 
approximately 70% by the 2020s, 
with a 120% increase by the 2050s 
(central estimates of the medium 
emissions scenario). 
Medium
Note: This does not include surface water flooding.
Source: Twigger-Ross, C. (2013)6 adapted from UK Climate Change Risk Assessment Evidence Report, 2012, Defra179.
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Disruptions to the environment also have implications for psychological security and can be an important 
factor for identities and behaviours. Flooding is a major concern which affects people’s lives, mental health and 
wellbeing, homes and identities. In 2007, flooding cost the economy more than £3 billion in England alone, 
while in 2009, the Cumbria floods resulted in £100s of millions of damage, including the loss of 20 road bridges 
and long-term disruption for local communities177. Mitigation of environmental changes such as flooding, heat 
waves and droughts can also affect people’s identities6, for example when communities at high risk of floods 
are relocated180. While many may be exposed to such risks, some are better able to protect themselves and 
their property than others, who are likely to become increasingly vulnerable and reliant upon external support 
(from local and national government) during a period of financial constraint. The location of specific vulnerable 
groups in areas at risk (for example, of flooding) means that a clear understanding of people’s identities will be 
an important factor for the development of resilient communities.
Overall perceptions of the risks arising from these climate change hazards appear to be fairly low181. Few people 
consider themselves at risk of flooding, while rising temperatures are considered benign (or even pleasant). 
Awareness of heat stress is very low among vulnerable groups. People’s identities may develop to become more 
resilient to environmental change and risk, and society may plan better for emergencies, but that is likely to take 
time182. For example, research into flooding suggests that behaviours to protect against flooding do not develop 
quickly6. Increasingly consideration is being given to the complex ethical, social and behavioural aspects of climate 
change183. The scenarios developed for this Report explore some of the potential impacts of environmental 
disruption through the example of Dylan (Box 3.8: Dylan 2019).
Box 3.8: Dylan 2019
These scenarios illustrate how drivers of change may affect 
individuals in different contexts
In 2019, Dylan starts drawing his pension but he carries on working regardless – partly by choice and partly due 
to circumstances as he has his elderly mother’s care home fees to pay for. He remains reluctant to accept any 
financial help from his daughter, who is now living in Bristol. He does accept help from her with accessing online 
services, and she helped him to vote online in the local election that year. He was unable to get to the polling 
station in person owing to some of the worst floods in Wales for years. Having witnessed past environmental 
disasters such as the 1966 Aberfan disaster, Dylan has a strong environmental consciousness and is concerned 
by the apparent increasing frequency of flooding events. Although their own property was, fortunately, not 
flooded, repair work in the village meant that Dylan and his wife were without internet and phone access for 
some time. Although his wife was frustrated at the additional difficulties caused by this, including being unable to 
contact their son overseas, Dylan appreciated being away from various technological distractions and felt that 
there was an additional sense of community in the village as everyone helped each other out.
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Summary
The strong attachments to places that many people have can be a core part of forming 
identities. Living and working environments affect levels of life satisfaction, health and 
wellbeing. The importance of the physical setting is unlikely to change radically in the 
decade ahead. Where people live is an important component of their identities, and so the 
quality, quantity and affordability of housing is a potential driver of change for identities, 
while living in an area of deprivation can also affect identities. Over the next decade 
there are likely to be changes to the environment through measures to address flooding, 
for example new housing development and infrastructure, which could have an impact on 
people’s identities. 
3.5 Political drivers
3.5.1 Trust
In the UK there has been a long-term trend of declining trust in figures of authority, from politicians to police 
officers184, which is likely to be linked in part to the decline of political engagement and changes in the notion of 
citizenship. The proportion of people who respond ‘Almost never’ to the question: ‘How much do you trust 
British governments of any party to place the needs of the nation above the interests of their own political 
party?’ increased from 11.8% in 1986 to 33.5% in 2011185. Alongside this, there could be a gradual shift in the 
relationships between the citizen and the state over the next 10 years, as government tries to renegotiate the 
rights and responsibilities of citizens, for example in welfare, health, or education, where people are expected 
to take more responsibility and the state becomes smaller. Less reliance on the state may have a positive effect 
on trust and citizenship for some groups, particularly those with stronger community identities and high levels of 
social capital. Highly interconnected local, voluntary associations, combining with stronger local leadership able 
to hold politicians and the state to account, might lead to higher levels of trust in society, and perhaps also to 
increases in political trust186. However, for some more vulnerable groups, the lack of trust in authority combined 
with the drive to shift responsibilities to individuals may create difficulties.
Over the past 10 years, turnout at general elections has been lower than in previous decades (Figure 3.6).  
There has also been a decline in affiliation with the main political parties, although this may be due in part to the 
perception that there are few differences between the main parties9. These long-term trends for reduced trust 
and political participation seem likely to continue14, unless circumstances change to increase political engagement. 
42
Figure	3.6:	General	Election	turnout	since	1945.
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In recent years the share of the vote going to minor parties (not the main three political parties) has been 
rising, although it is important to recognise that support for minor parties has very different sources. Support 
for the Green Party tends to be greater among younger, highly educated citizens. Older, less educated, more 
disadvantaged voters, or those who feel threatened by immigration (the perceived competition for jobs and the 
perceived threat to their identity by different value systems9), are more likely to support the UK Independence 
Party, or possibly the British National Party. While current trends suggest that support for minor parties both 
on the left and the right is likely to increase, the rate of change is likely to depend on the extent to which 
government is able to resolve issues with the economy, immigration, and the environment in ways that address 
citizens’ current grievances. It is unlikely that there will be a ‘tipping point’ in the next 10 years where a minor 
party might gain an overall win in a general election, but minor parties and independent candidates are already 
being more successful, being elected as MPs and MEPsvii, while coalition politics are already a reality.
Alongside the decline in trust in authority, there has been rapid growth over the past few years in surveillance 
and the collection of personal data by both the state and private companies191. While some of this surveillance 
may be broadly popular with citizens (such as some uses of CCTV), the range of data collected to provide online 
services, to support investigative efforts (such as mobile phone records) or to support consumer profiling is 
likely to affect the relationships between the state, citizens and commercial organisations. Pervasive surveillance 
may reduce the ability to build trusting relations between people, and between people, organisations, and the 
state. The scenarios developed for this Report consider this issue through the prism of Dylan’s life, showing 
how in 10 years’ time he could feel confused and disenchanted by all the changes which have affected him 
(Box 3.9: Dylan 2023).
vii Member of the European Parliament.
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Box 3.9: Dylan 2023
These scenarios illustrate how drivers of change may affect 
individuals in different contexts
By 2023, and now aged 70, Dylan feels he is having a good life overall, but not without its challenges and 
disappointments. It seems to him that businesses seem to know all about him now and he is confused and 
resentful over how they have got this private information. It seems to him that while things have really changed 
in the past 10 years and the world is more complicated, things have not got any better. If anything, he has had to 
work even harder to look after his family. Consequently, despite being a lifelong Labour supporter, he is seriously 
considering voting for Plaid Cymru for the first time at the next general election. Dylan is disenchanted with the 
outside world and concerned about his future.
The same trends have, however, increased citizens’ abilities to monitor and access information about the 
authorities. Young people’s experiences of using the internet tend to include phenomena such as peer-to-peer 
sharing and Open Access resources. These may be transforming the concept of democracy and may have a 
significant impact on political identities2. Politics is being fundamentally influenced by these trends towards a 
model of greater openness, transparency, and shared identities. Younger people are more likely to identify with 
libertarian rather than authoritarian values compared with older generations192. If this group keep their values as 
they enter middle-age and replace older cohorts, Britain may become more libertarian as a whole14. This may 
be more likely if these younger people fail to benefit from social and economic structures. However, if they do 
become wealthier and more invested in the status quo, they may become more right-leaning as they grow older.
Trust and civic engagement are not solely dependent on citizens’ attitudes towards authority, but are also 
embedded in the connections and associations that citizens form themselves193, as well as the structures and 
mechanisms designed to constrain the actions of government and the private sector194. While people no longer 
believe that politicians ‘know what’s best’, there is little evidence that trust between citizens is similarly falling. 
Indeed, people are often more willing to trust in those they know personally195. 
Since 2010, the Coalition Government in the UK has implemented far reaching reforms, including a programme 
of public spending cuts and tax increases from 2010 to 2015. The reforms also include a restructure of state 
services, involving a significant transfer of responsibility from the state to the private sector and to the citizen196, 
with the aim of creating a welfare system that rewards work, and an education system that encourages 
achievement and drives social mobility197. People are increasingly expected to take on personal responsibility 
for providing for themselves and to guard against the consequences of becoming more vulnerable, for example 
through provision of pensions. However, for some people it may be very difficult to adopt such a future-
oriented identity, in part because of the difficult economic climate and the trend towards greater social plurality, 
and so the extent to which people can take responsibility for themselves and plan for the future may be uneven.
3.5.2 ‘Britishness’
Since 1992, the percentage of people in England who thought of themselves as primarily or exclusively ‘British’ 
declined from 63%, to 39% in 2006. In Scotland, 25% of people thought of themselves as British in 1992, 
declining to 14% in 2006, while growing numbers of people thought of themselves as Scottish, Welsh or English 
(or none of these) rather than British198. A strong sense of belonging to Europe as an identity remains very 
rare in the UK, although European identities are somewhat more common among younger people than they 
are among older generations16. People with ‘civic’ rather than ‘ethnic’ conceptions of national identity tend 
to be less hostile to Europe and to support greater European integration, and these views tend to be more 
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common among the young and highly educated16. Conversely, there is also evidence that the ‘white working 
class’ continue to draw on an ethnic rather than civic definition of ‘Britishness’199. As a consequence, inequality of 
opportunity for this group is attributed to the presence of minority or migrant groups rather than being viewed 
through upward social comparisons. This perception continues to provide fertile ground for the potential rise of 
far right politics in the UK and is likely to continue to do so over the next 10 years. 
Trends such as globalisation, ease of travel, new technology, constitutional changes, and social and 
intergenerational changes may affect national identities200. Age seems to be a key factor. For younger people 
(16–24 year olds) in terms of their sense of belonging to Britain, in 2010 only 41% felt that they ‘Belong very 
strongly’ to Britain (Table 3.4). However, the older age groups exhibit steadily increasing levels of belonging, 
reaching 74% among respondents aged 85 or over16. As older generations are replaced by younger generations, 
a sense of belonging to Britain and British national identity is expected to decline over time201 if people keep 
their present views.
Table	3.4:	Home	Office	Citizenship	Survey	2010	asking	people	to	rate	whether	they	feel	they	‘Belong	strongly’	
to	Britain.	
2010 Belong very strongly (%) Belong fairly strongly (%) Do not belong strongly (%) Base
16–24 41 46 13 1,302
25–34 39 46 16 1,409
35–44 44 41 16 1,609
45–54 46 40 18 1,427
55–64 56 32 12 1,264
65–74 65 25 10 897
75–84 69 22  9 649
85+ 74 22  4 188
All 50 37 12 8,745
Male 49 38 14 4,276
Female 51 37 12 4,470
All 50 37 12 8,746
Note:  Weighted by ‘core’ weight, individual weight for core sample for quarters 1, 2, 3 and 4; respondents in England only. 
Source: Home Office202.
There is no simple relationship between national identity and constitutional preferences. In Northern 
Ireland, there is some evidence that the relationship between national identity and constitutional preference 
is weakening due to decline in support for a united Ireland among those who report an Irish identity9. For 
Scotland, around half of those with strong Scottish identities nevertheless say that they would prefer Scotland 
to remain part of the UK. Given the modest effects of the 1997 devolution arrangements in the UK on national 
identities, it is unlikely that further devolution for Wales or Scotland will have major implications for British 
national identity8. However, if Scottish independence were to lead to a reduction in the notion of ‘Britishness’ 
and an increase in ‘Englishness’ as an identity, this could lead to an identity crisis for ethnic minorities, who 
typically are less able to access an ‘English’ identity8 15. 
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Some evidence suggests that many citizens of the UK still favour dual identities (for example, British and English, 
or British and Welsh)7. A survey in 2010 showed that 37% of those born and living in England said they felt only 
or mainly English and 46% felt equally English and British, while in Scotland 73% felt only or mainly Scottish 
and 21% equally Scottish and British200. Most minorities have both ethnic and British identities, reinforcing the 
multiple and overlapping nature of many identities. In the scenarios developed for this Report, Esther embraces 
Scottish identity alongside her British identity, but still feels she is an outsider (Box 3.10: 
Esther 2023).
Box 3.10: Esther 2023
These scenarios illustrate how drivers of change may affect 
individuals in different contexts
In 2023 Esther is 32 years old and working as an art curator in a small museum near Glasgow. She feels settled 
in Scotland and intends to remain there permanently. However, she does not feel accepted by many Scots as 
she thinks that they continue to view her as something of an outsider, even though she has embraced Scottish 
culture. Esther is aware that she doesn’t entirely fit in and her Yorkshire twang hasn’t entirely gone, but feels both 
British and Glaswegian all the same. She is attached to Scotland and feels a sense of community there. Partly 
to try and fit in, she has joined the SNP and is taking evening classes to learn traditional Scottish crafts. She 
is often online in virtual ‘cafés’ where she maintains a large social network of people from across the UK and 
internationally, and feels as close to her virtual friends all over the world as she does to her friends in Glasgow.
Minority ethnic groups tend to have fairly strong levels of identification with a British national identity16 (Figure 3.7), 
which can be even stronger among the younger generation. People of Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage 
express particularly high levels of British identity. A strong religious identity can also coexist comfortably with 
dual national or ethnic identities15 203. There is no evidence that Muslim Pakistanis, for example, are more inclined 
towards ‘separatist’ identities; if anything the reverse is the case15. Muslim individuals who identify strongly as 
British can see their Muslim identity as reinforcing their sense of ‘Britishness’ through shared moral values10. 
For these people, the experience of being viewed as ‘other’ (for example, through counter-terrorism measures 
such as being stopped and searched) is experienced as profoundly negative because it questions the validity 
of a highly valued aspect of identity. These measures can be counter-productive if they make ordinary British 
citizens feel under suspicion204. Negative experiences can lead people to feel that they are less able to influence 
fellow Muslims to engage in mainstream society, and even encourage them to be sympathetic towards more 
confrontational Muslim views10. The actions and rhetoric of the majority White British community will affect 
how minority groups feel or react to perceived injustices.
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Figure	3.7:	Summary	of	national	identity	by	ethnic	group.
Ethnic group
Other ethnic group
Chinese
Black African
Black Caribbean
Other Asian
Bangladeshi
Pakistani
Indian
Mixed 
White
100 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
% of population
■ British only
■ British and other UK
■ Other country and British
■ Other country
■ UK country identity ■ None
Source: Home Office, 2009–10 Citizenship Survey202.
Summary
In the UK, there is a long-term trend of declining trust in figures of authority, from politicians 
to police officers. This trend is reflected in political fragmentation and the rise of single issue 
political parties. Social changes are driving people’s national identities and the extent to 
which they identify as ‘British’. Over the timescales of this Report, there may be only gradual 
change to identities in terms of partisanship and national identity. However, as the scenarios 
showed using the examples of Esther and Dylan, individuals are affected to varying extents by 
these trends (see Box 3.11: Scenarios summary).
473. Drivers of change
Box 3.11: Scenarios summary
These scenarios illustrate how drivers of change may affect 
individuals in different contexts
Key message
Dylan and Esther’s stories show that over 10 years of their lives, different aspects of their identities become 
of greater or lesser importance depending on their circumstances. For Dylan, family relationships and his 
local community continue to be key parts of his identity, while he tries to move with the times by beginning 
to explore the internet but with a sense of being a trespasser into a world he does not yet fully understand. 
For Esther, the decade is one of trying to develop herself as an independent adult, within the constraints of 
economic austerity. For both individuals, wider trends affect their lives and identities, but at some times these 
drivers of change are subsumed by more pressing local or personal concerns.
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Over the next 10 years, UK government policy makers will have to respond to a variety 
of new opportunities and challenges affecting people’s identities. While some traditional 
categories of identity are unlikely to change significantly, other aspects of identity and 
the expression of identity will change relatively quickly. The main themes which will 
characterise this period of change will be hyper-connectivity, a more pluralised society, and 
blurring between public and private identities. The pace of change in these areas appears to 
be increasing, being partly driven by the internet facilitating online communities of interest. 
It will be critical to understand the context-specific nature of people’s identities, as they 
alter according to circumstances. The implications are that policy will be more effective if 
the evolving and complex nature of identity is considered during the process of developing 
and delivering policy. The Government is already moving towards making fuller use of the 
digital environment by providing services online, and through ‘Open Policy Making’205. 
This Report reinforces the importance of this approach, while suggesting key areas where 
attention will need to be focused. 
This chapter draws on the evidence discussed in Chapter 3 to explore specific challenges and opportunities for 
policy makers over the next 10 years. The drivers of change identified in this Report indicate that traditional 
social and biographical categories of identity (age, ethnicity, religion, nationality, local community, and political 
allegiances) will continue to exert influence, but are unlikely to show any significant change, and may gradually 
become less important. Some drivers are likely to lead to much more rapid change in identities. The impact 
of social media, the development of increasingly dense networks of information, and rapid developments in 
mobile communications technology will continue to transform the ways in which people interact both locally 
and globally. Three overarching themes will be central to this more rapid change over the next 10 years: hyper-
connectivity; increasing social plurality; and blurring between public and private identities. These are discussed in 
detail in the following section. The chapter goes on to consider the potential implications of changing identities 
for specific areas of government policy: social mobility; social integration; radicalisation and extremism; health, 
environment and wellbeing; skills, employment and education; and crime and criminal justice.
4.1 Key themes of changing identities
From the wide range of evidence on identities considered in Chapter 3, three important overarching themes 
were identified which merit particular attention by policy makers: 
•	 Increasing	hyper-connectivity: people can now be ‘connected’ at all times. There is convergence between 
online and offline identities, as the digital divide dissolves, especially for the younger ‘Generation Z’. Identities 
are becoming more susceptible to change, and highly context-specific.
•	 Increasing	social	plurality: this means that identities are becoming more varied, and less reliant on 
traditional social categories. However, since a decade is a short time span for significant social change, 
a trend of gradual evolution and relative stability should be expected in some areas, such as religious 
identities. 
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•	 Blurring	of	public	and	private	identities: attitudes to privacy are changing and people are more willing 
to place private information about themselves into public domains, and to cede control of their identities. 
The result is an increasing convergence between private and public identities.
Each of these themes is discussed briefly in the following sections. They provide a starting point for policy 
makers to consider how the many trends and issues set out in Chapter 3 might together create particular 
challenges and opportunities for society as a whole. 
4.1.1 Increasing hyper-connectivity
The trend towards hyper-connectivity suggests that changes in social and technological environments will 
combine to exert a particularly important influence on people’s identities. In particular, the increasing speed and 
mobility of internet access, together with greater take-up and penetration into all aspects of people’s lives, will 
act to reduce meaningful differentiation between online and offline lives and identities, and could increase the 
pace and turbulence of social change.
Digital technology is transforming the ways in which young people, in particular, manage their social relations and 
identities206. The term ‘swarming’ has been used to describe how people can use mobile technology to keep in 
touch with large numbers of other people and to organise impromptu gatherings207. In terms of identities, this 
means that increasingly, young people no longer see themselves as members of one distinct social group, but 
belong to several more amorphous groups. Hyper-connectivity can also enable the mobilisation of groups, using 
identity as a resource for social or political change. These mobilisations may take the form of ‘flash mobs’ which 
are rapidly organised using varied media, often dissipating as quickly as they appear. Younger people are much 
more likely to be hyper-connected, and this may strengthen and facilitate new protest movements, for example 
drawing attention to social, political, environmental or global issues, and mobilising protestors, including people 
who were not previously associated with any radical action. The impact of the equally hyper-connected media 
environment can amplify and add momentum to such movements, creating larger-scale public issues which 
could be unanticipated.
The rapid speed of modern globalised communications creates an environment for identities in the UK to be 
influenced by issues and events emanating from Europe, the USA or further afield, with new communities of 
interest continually forming and dispersing. This has many positive outcomes for society, including increasing 
awareness of global events, but this trend could also add a further layer of uncertainty and volatility. Therefore, 
a particular challenge posed by hyper-connectivity will be the potential for greater social turbulence which could 
be difficult to predict or anticipate. Policy makers will need to be alert to adverse consequences caused by these 
kinds of changes, as they could challenge social order. However, it is important not to see changing identities as 
a threat to society2, as this could itself generate a negative reaction with possibly undesirable consequences10. 
Hyper-connectivity could enable some people whose work and home identities, for example, come into 
conflict, to achieve a more integrated and coherent sense of self2.
A further challenge is raised by the sheer speed of communications. Hyper-connected citizens may well expect 
government to respond with similar swiftness and to be able to react in real time to current events, or at 
least to act more quickly. They may also expect that government should draw upon a good understanding of 
the different identities and perspectives involved. This high expectation of agility and responsiveness poses a 
real challenge for policy makers. While policies that are responsive to changing identities are likely to be more 
effective, equally there are dangers in being either over-reactive or superficial. A compromise will therefore 
need to be found between responsiveness and agility, and the more measured approaches that have been used 
by policy makers in the past.
50
4.1.2 Increasing social plurality
The evidence reviewed in Chapter 3 suggests an overarching trend towards greater social plurality or 
heterogeneity in UK society. The norms to which people conform in their behaviour or their views may become 
fewer, and world-views could become more diverse. Drivers of this trend include: the shifting demographics of 
an ageing population; larger numbers of dependants (older people and those under 16) depending on a smaller 
working population; greater diversity with a larger proportion of minority ethnic groups, spread more widely 
around the UK; changing patterns of immigration especially from the EU; the economic downturn, which inevitably 
affects sections of the population in different ways; the fragmentation of political affiliation and declining party 
political engagement; and developments in communications technology, transforming the way in which people 
group themselves to form new dispersed or ‘virtual’ communities. These drivers of change acting together may 
diversify society into less integrated, more transient groupings, creating a plurality of groups and individuals.
There may be greater differentiation of age-related identities, reflecting both demographic change and possibly 
the diverging economic interests between age groups. A key issue for policy makers is the potential long-term 
effects of the recession on the identities of those who lost their jobs, or on young people who were unable to 
secure jobs, bearing in mind the evidence for greater income inequality in the UK discussed in Chapter 3 and the 
possibility of more segregation between the very wealthy and the long-term unemployed or low-income families.
Increasing social plurality does not necessarily imply greater conflict or a threat to social solidarity. Rather, 
it suggests a society based on difference (personal and social) as opposed to similarities or notions of the 
average. For example, online ‘virtual’ communities of interest can provide a new focus for group identities and 
support networks. For local communities based on geographical identities, local issues such as longer-term 
environmental change or shorter-term challenges from infrastructure projects may result in communities coming 
together in response to specific threats, or opportunities. 
As the horizon of this Report is only a decade ahead, and some trends change very slowly, there is likely to be 
only gradual evolution or stability of some aspects of identities. The evidence set out in Chapter 3 suggests that 
religious, class and national identities are likely either to decline on average or to remain relatively stable over the 
next 10 years. It is possible that there could be a revival of strong religious identities, for example in response to 
some major event, but the most likely course is for gradual secularisation among most major faiths. Within this 
general trend, there may be some variation, with a potential increase in ultra-orthodox identities within some 
religions, for example among Jews, evangelical Christians and Muslims. To some extent, long-standing religious 
identities support social integration, as they encompass large groups of citizens in shared group identities.  
It seems most likely that there will be only a very gradual change in British, Scottish and other national identities 
in the UK, although this could be influenced by the outcome of any future referenda, for example on Scottish 
independence. To some extent, and in some circumstances, these national identities bring groups of people 
together in a shared identity; and so they are also a factor in social integration.
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4.1.3 Blurring of public and private identities
Attitudes to privacy are changing and people are more willing to place personal information into public domains, 
such as social media, giving rise to a convergence between previously private and public identities. Posting 
mobile phone photographs and videos online has led to a cultural shift, where many people broadcast their 
daily lives and experiences, creating a virtual autobiography208, rather than protect their privacy. Younger people 
tend to be less concerned with privacy, but it is entirely possible that, over time, the amount of information 
about them available online will begin to be used in unexpected ways. They may not fully understand the 
extent to which they have ceded control of aspects of their identities to private sector companies. The need 
for government to balance the conflicting needs of security and the public good, with protecting privacy 
and individual liberty is already well established. However, the ever-increasing amount of private and public 
information creates potential benefits through better targeting of services and greater responsiveness from 
organisations and government. 
Surveillance technologies operated by the state and by the private sector offer opportunities for greater 
protection and public security, but there are also broader social effects to consider. The level of trust between 
citizens and authority is critical to issues such as holding, protecting and regulating personal data, and the use 
of ‘big data’ sets. For example, the ability of young people to explore and establish their own identities might 
be restricted if they feel that controversial views, or involvement in social protest, might count against them 
later in life. Citizens could feel their identities are potentially subject to scrutiny and judgment, and that this 
might undermine their freedom of expression and damage their trust in the state. There are currently many 
forms of resistance to the collection and analysis of personal data by individuals, campaign groups and civil 
liberties organisations. People and groups might, for example, adapt their behaviour in order to avoid being 
tracked, or use surveillance technologies to record and reflect the behaviour of the authorities, such as when 
demonstrators film the police. There is also direct action against surveillance technologies, including attacks on 
speed cameras, organised campaigns and freedom of information campaigning organisations. As the collection 
and analysis of personal data intensifies, resistance may increase. These forms of resistance have the potential to 
influence people’s identities, both at the level of the individual and the group, in the future. 
Summary
Citizens will increasingly be characterised as hyper-connected individuals who make choices 
which reflect their identities. Simple categorisations based on ‘traditional’ notions of 
identities are likely to become less meaningful in the digital age as it gathers pace over 
the next decade. To be effective, policy makers will need to engage with citizens at a 
number of levels, online and offline, and be more agile in responding to the challenges 
of a digital environment.
These three themes taken together suggest the following implications for government: 
• There is a clear case for government to take a more detailed and nuanced consideration 
of identities when developing, implementing and testing policies, for example in initiatives 
such as Test, Learn, Adapt 209, and draw upon a deeper scientific understanding of 
people’s evolving identities to improve the design and effectiveness of policies. 
• The increasing speed and connectivity of information technology systems, which is a key 
driver of these effects, also offers opportunities for both monitoring what is happening 
in real time and assessing the effectiveness of specific policies. 
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Together, these would enable policies to evolve in a faster, more effective, and more reflexive manner. In some 
cases, it may be possible to learn from problems and adapt policies in real time. However, further work would 
be required to address questions over how this could be achieved in terms of technical feasibility, the value of 
different media in providing feedback, and whether the public would be willing to accept more iterative policy 
making and actively contribute to its improvement, such as through Open Policy Makingviii. There are examples 
that show how a better appreciation of different identities can offer new insights for policy makers, such as field 
research which demonstrates how self-identities, personal norms, and neighbourhood identification can be used 
to predict recycling behaviours, showing that pro-recycling interventions can promote positive behaviours by 
appealing to self-identity and making people feel like recyclers210. Other projects have used identities to build 
social capital, for example among young people from urban minority ethnic groups in London. A programme 
designed to raise self-esteem, and discourage involvement in crime and participation in gangs, used a contextual 
understanding of their experiences of school and ‘street life’, family and social relationships, and explored how 
trust, awareness and self-empowerment might be generated211.
4.2 Implications for specific areas of policy
This section discusses how the evidence set out in Chapter 3, and the three overarching themes discussed 
above, may have influence in six important areas of government policy over the next decade. It sets out some 
of the key challenges, opportunities and questions for policy makers to address. However, because of the 
wide-ranging nature of this Report and the many pervasive effects of identities on a wide range of government 
policies, the areas chosen are illustrative rather than exhaustive. The areas considered are:
• Social mobility
• Social integration
• Radicalisation and extremism
• Health, environment and wellbeing
• Skills, employment and education
• Crime and criminal justice
4.2.1 Social mobility
The trend towards greater social plurality with a variety of multiple, changing identities, 
means that mapping and understanding social mobility will become more complex in future. 
Some of the trends suggest there will be more divergence between groups, which may make 
social mobility more problematic by increasing barriers for more marginalised groups. 
Perceptions of unfairness in access to opportunities, rather than actual inequality, may 
in turn reinforce certain kinds of social identities and increase the potential for collective 
action. However, as access to the internet and hyper-connectivity increase, information and 
education may become more freely available and shared, enhancing life opportunities for 
many individuals. There are challenges over the extent of digital provision and differential 
access between generations, between social classes, and between geographical regions, 
which may favour some people over others. The extent of digital literacy as an enabler of 
identity expression is likely to remain a key policy issue.
viii ‘Open Policy Making’ is a way of making government policy making more open to external influences, and more contestable, through shared 
power, transparency, real-world testing and iteration205. 
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The key challenge will be to understand and monitor inequalities of opportunity and perceptions of unfainess, 
especially for vulnerable subgroups. Vulnerable subgroups include not only the ‘equality groups’ identified in 
the 2010 Equality Act, but also groups such as young people, who could become marginalised by the labour 
market and who may suffer long-term effects due to the recession. Inequality or lack of social mobility does not 
in itself necessarily entail conflict. Perceptions of fairness in the allocation of rewards, and fair routes of access to 
privileged positions, appear to be more important than income inequality. 
While general policies designed to promote social mobility will continue to be important, some vulnerable groups 
may face distinct barriers that might not necessarily be addressed by more general policies. Understanding the 
nature of the barriers faced, and developing policies tailored to address them, will be important. Such barriers 
might include ones such as the ‘chill factor’, where individuals do not feel welcome in certain environments 
and so are discouraged from entering them, thereby excluding themselves. Attracting such groups will require 
effective outreach programmes based on a sophisticated understanding of the self-identities of individuals in the 
target groups. 
Digital technology will play an ever-increasing role in the development and expression of identities. Therefore, 
levels of access to the internet and computer skills for individuals will be important for society and for the UK, 
potentially playing a key role in global competitiveness. Given that identities are both a social and personal 
resource, it will become even more necessary to ensure equality of digital access, freedom of expression, and 
security. There is a danger that full engagement with the digital environment might remain largely a middle and 
higher-income preserve, which may create new forms of inequality while potentially entrenching existing ones 
more deeply. However, there are also opportunities to increase equality of access and facilitate greater social 
mobility. The UK’s focus on digital network provision and access will remain important, particularly in relation 
to higher access speeds, mobile and fixed access, and for disadvantaged rural communities. 
4.2.2 Social integration
The trend towards great social plurality, demographic trends and the gradual reduction in 
importance of some traditional aspects of identity, suggest that communities in the UK over 
the next 10 years are likely to become less cohesive as traditional identities become more 
fragmented. However, hyper-connectivity can also create or strengthen new group identities. 
Policy makers will need to understand how policies affect individuals differently, taking into 
consideration indirect as well as direct impacts, and any unintended effects of government 
policy and social change. These will not always be immediately apparent, so continued 
monitoring and evaluation will be needed. There will also be opportunities for policy to 
support social integration and acknowledge new forms of community as they emerge.
Trends explored in Chapter 3, including demographic change, immigration, diversity, the ageing population, 
and the economy, are likely to influence people’s identities and expectations. Young people may have very 
different expectations from previous cohorts in terms of wealth creation and debt, home ownership, careers 
and stability. Uncertainties over future economic growth may also give rise to a lack of feeling of belonging, and 
less social investment for the future by some groups. This may raise issues for personal debt management and 
saving, affordable homes, and the labour market. The growth in the so-called ‘sandwich’ generation, who have 
responsibilities for both childrearing and elderly care, also has implications for social policy as this group may 
demand greater recognition and, potentially, assistance, financial or otherwise13. 
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Over the next 10 years, identity will continue to be a driving factor in social protest10. In understanding 
protest, it is important not to oversimplify the way in which the dynamics between groups can play a part in 
creating conflict, and the way in which relations between underprivileged local communities and the police 
can create tension10. In the aftermath of the recession, there is a risk that the negative longer-term impacts of 
unemployment and reduced opportunity could affect particular social groups, such as those already living in 
disadvantaged areas or in poverty10 15. For example, it is well known that high numbers of young Black people 
are not in education, training or employment16. A nuanced understanding of the relationship between groups 
would address the differentials and, since people’s identities are multifaceted, policies which reinforce this 
complexity rather than dwelling on single group memberships could lead to greater social integration11. 
Policy makers should take into account the potential impacts of their policies on a range of different identities 
in particular contexts, including indirect social consequences. The peace process in Northern Ireland gives 
some indication of how this challenge can be approached through an understanding of the role of political and 
cultural identities in resolving conflict7. The spread of liberal and more civic identities and values may provide 
an important resource for more inclusive forms of participation and a more tolerant society14. There are 
opportunities for policy makers to reduce conflict, prejudice and discrimination, and promote policies which 
encourage social integration. Consideration could also be given to the validity of new forms of virtual and other 
transient communities to see how they can support individuals.
Lack of social integration can also occur as a result of individuals restricting their social and civic involvement, 
and becoming socially isolated, which restricts the development of positive social identities in favour of excluded 
group or individual identities. Consideration will need to be given to ensuring that such vulnerable communities 
are not neglected.
4.2.3 Radicalisation and extremism
Trends in changing identities in the UK over the next 10 years will be a crucial factor in 
understanding extremism and radicalisation. The trends towards greater social plurality, 
declining trust in authority, and increasing take-up of new technologies may all pose 
challenges for policy makers seeking to manage these issues. It will be important for policy 
makers to consider how decision making might affect some group identities and be a 
possible catalyst for negative reactions. 
The evidence on changing identities set out in Chapter 3 suggests that while there is the potential for 
radicalisation and extremism driven by hyper-connectivity and increasing social plurality, it is important to 
recognise that the translation of potential into collective action is unpredictable, and depends on various 
triggering events or mobilisation activities. This unpredictability increases the need for flexibility, and care 
in planning and responding to events. 
This section does not address extremism in, or radicalisation of, any particular groups but considers the 
underlying factors which could potentially drive extremism or radicalisation in the future. The themes set out 
earlier in this chapter suggest that individual, political, and social identities will become more volatile, as people 
may come into contact with new ideas, form new links and connections online and offline, and form new or 
transient communities of interest. Identity can be a resource for social upheaval, or resistance to change, or can 
become a locus for protest. As discussed earlier, it can also be a resource for cohesion and resilience.
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Extremism includes a range of behaviours which have different motivations and ideologies, and it is important 
to differentiate between legitimate protest and criminal behaviour. Extremism could encompass far right 
groups, animal rights extremists, anti-GM protesters, Islamic radicals, or a range of other groups, including ones 
which cannot be foreseen. While the actions of many such groups will be entirely legitimate or benign, some 
groups may form around more radicalised or extremist ideologies, including some with authority-challenging 
behaviours14. One major challenge could be in preventing a rise of the far right, or increasing xenophobic 
rhetoric9 10, where effective policy interventions could be informed by an understanding of the impact of current 
policies, for example where they may have unintended consequences by excluding particular identities. 
Much of the concern about the potential for radicalisation, for example in Muslim communities, is focused on 
the exploitation by radicals of individuals made vulnerable to radicalisation, whether through family or social 
rejection or negative experiences with authority. In this context, it has been argued that radicals can offer 
the solace of a cohesive group10. The role of online channels is often seen as crucial in providing support and 
information to facilitate radicalisation. It is true that the internet may provide a medium in which extreme 
views can become accentuated and normalised, but such material can also be placed online precisely because 
it is ineffective offline2. At the same time, the internet can provide a platform for open debate and challenge. 
So while hyper-connectivity may link individuals in the UK with radicalised groups based elsewhere, it can also 
provide alternative and more moderate viewpoints. 
4.2.4 Health, environment and wellbeing
Places are very important to forming and understanding identity. A strong sense of 
‘belonging’ to places, families, and communities can promote wellbeing. Policies which 
could disrupt place identity may therefore have implications for city development, 
planning, building, infrastructure and transport, where potential impacts will need to be 
managed sensitively to avoid unnecessary distress. Places can be restorative, and so policies 
which promote green spaces and protect the countryside can be important for health and 
wellbeing. The development of biomedical technologies could potentially be transformative 
for how people relate to themselves, others, and their environment: but there are complex 
ethical and practical implications for government in regulating and responding to them.
Chapter 3 sets out how environmental and place-based changes over the next 10 years may affect people’s 
identities. ‘Place’ is a key context for identity, as people respond in complex ways to their immediate 
environment. Environments such as green space and countryside can foster wellbeing and be ‘restorative’, while 
adverse environments can cause stress. The impact of environmental disruption can be disruptive for place-
based identity. Policies in planning, transport, infrastructure and development which could potentially threaten 
place identities will need to take into account the potential impact on individual and community identities. The 
importance of preserving green and publicly accessible open spaces, and designing restorative environments 
should be considered within the context of identity and wellbeing. 
Place and how people relate to the physical world are likely to be closely affected by new and emerging 
technologies. In the future, the emergence of an ‘intelligent’ or smart environment could lead to even closer 
relationships with place; for example, mobile technology enables people to be hyper-connected even in a 
very remote place. Tracking and identification technologies could change people’s relationships with places. In 
time, some of these technologies may become more readily available and be integrated into ‘smart’ fabrics and 
clothing, or even bodies.
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Biomedical technological developments are likely to gather momentum over the next 10 years. This could raise 
important philosophical questions about the nature and normative limits of human identity, and about the 
ethical implications of using biomedical technologies to alter human identity212. This may include ‘enhancement’ 
technologies, which can be closely related to individual identity and cultural expectations, relating to cultural 
norms and perceptions. These affect ascribed identities, with implications for marginalisation, inclusion and 
exclusion. 
Biomedical technologies may increasingly remove distinctions between those with disabilities and those without, 
as well as blurring traditional age, gender, and role boundaries. Some of these developments can be expected 
over the next decade. Since all these developments are resource intensive, they also raise the possibility of 
reinforcing inequality between those who have more and those who have fewer economic resources. They raise 
potential questions about the control of an individual’s body and privacy if, over the longer-term, technologies 
that are invasive of brain activity and bodily function begin to be used. There is already an extensive literature 
in this area discussing the profound ethical and practical implications for governments, policy makers and 
healthcare workers as they regulate and fund health, medicine and social care. 
4.2.5 Skills, employment and education
Digital literacy is essential to enable people to make full use of computing and the internet 
to express their identities, and to connect with social media, services, and information. This 
section focuses on raising awareness of the permanence of personal information available 
on the internet. Digital literacy will also be crucial to address a potential skills gap to 
enable the UK to be globally competitive in making best use of the technology revolution.  
A key issue for the future will be to ensure adequate levels of technological literacy across 
all social groups, to enable individuals to take control of their own online identities, and  
to be aware of their online presence and how it could be used by others. 
As hyper-connectivity increases, people need to have a well-developed level of technological literacy to be able 
to express their identity online effectively and to manage different aspects of their online presence safely. To 
enable this, communications technology and computer skills must continue to be a key part of policies on skills 
and education from an early age, and be taught to a quality standard with a well-informed perspective on what 
level of skills will be needed in the future. Ensuring these skills are taught properly will also be critical for the 
workplace, as IT proficiency will be of growing importance for employers. In practice, the benefits will not be 
realised without a substantial investment in the education of a trained workforce. At present, there is likely to 
be a skills shortage which could prevent the UK from realising the potential of its workers, and potentially inhibit 
economic growth. There is a significant opportunity to address the potential skills gap, especially for high-tech 
industries, to make sure the UK is best placed to reap the benefits of new technology115.
The evidence in Chapter 3 shows that rising numbers of people have some digital presence whether they 
choose to or not. This can potentially affect their future employment, as employers increasingly check online 
information, and can cross-reference between different online platforms which are often themselves interlinked. 
The persistence and availability of data on the internet means that social and biographical identities will overlap 
to a much greater degree, for example across personal and professional spheres. Private lives are likely to 
become more public, especially among younger people who have a more open attitude to their personal 
privacy. Personal information could be made available to unintended audiences, with potential consequences for 
future careers. Such information could be increasingly used by employers for informal vetting, or to identify likely 
recruits213. Raising public awareness of these issues will be critical in helping people to manage their online 
identities. Computer literacy skills for younger people as well as older people will be important to allow people 
to access and curate their online identities, and to protect themselves by understanding how personal 
information online can be cross-referenced and used, and how difficult it is to remove data from the digital 
environment. 
574. Challenges and opportunities
As an ageing population and older workforce creates changing identities, inequality in digital knowledge and 
skills, particularly among older workers and the retired elderly, will need to be addressed. These groups are 
among some of the most rapidly connecting, and with devices becoming more intuitive and evidence of strong 
inter-generational support (certainly within middle/higher-income groups), many among these cohorts are 
digitally literate. However, there still remains a significant need for lifelong education to ensure the greatest 
possible numbers of people are employable, active and able to live full social lives. 
4.2.6 Crime and criminal justice
The drivers of change for identities suggest a complex picture in the field of law 
enforcement and the UK’s legal system and jurisdiction. The growing quantity of personal 
and financial data online means that there will be more opportunity for criminal 
exploitation: however, there are also opportunities for enhanced crime prevention, 
intelligence gathering, and crime detection. ‘Open source’ intelligence will become more 
important for detecting patterns of criminal behaviour, but the quantity of data available 
will make the location and analysis of relevant data more problematic, and will require 
the right skills and resources. The police and other organisations will need to take account 
of the multifaceted and dynamic nature of identity, while the legal system will need to 
continue to ensure that people’s identities online and offline are protected. 
Crime	and	crime	prevention
Themes such as greater social plurality, hyper-connectivity and the blurring of public and private identities could 
all have implications for crime and security. While many of the current opportunities for criminal exploitation 
will continue to expand over the next decade, there will also be greater opportunities for crime prevention and 
detection, and for intelligence gathering and policing. Growing quantities of personal and financial information 
online will lead to more criminal exploitation of such data. Crime analysts have begun to use software for social 
network analysis to analyse criminal networks that use the internet to discuss their activities, plan, and learn  
new methods19. 
The evidence in this Report suggests that identities are complex, multifaceted, and contextual. This suggests 
that profiling of criminals, or potential criminals, based on stereotypes is unhelpful. Using ‘average’ profiles for 
different groups as a basis to predict behaviour or identify individuals of potential interest may be of limited 
effectiveness, because such an approach fails to recognise the diversity of identities. Nevertheless, technological 
advances can assist in tracking people online and verifying that they are who they claim to be, as a method of 
crime prevention, through improved verification techniques such as facial recognition technology214, tracking 
digital ‘footprints’ created by regular patterns of using pathways and networks, and greater sophistication in 
identifying irregularities in behaviour that could indicate potential criminal behaviour or victimisation. Textual 
analysis can similarly be used to reveal irregularities in style and content that may indicate that the individual is 
committing a crime, or being victimised. In theory, in future it will be possible to identify an individual merely 
by their actions19. It seems likely that some aspects of online criminal behaviour could in future become harder 
to hide. However, there is also the potential for mistaken association, where innocent behaviour is tagged as 
potentially criminal, or ‘trial by algorithm’215.
The ability of law enforcement to adapt and respond to changing identities and technologies will be important 
in leveraging what advantage can be gained in crime prevention and detection. The increasing loss of anonymity 
online, as facial recognition technology, ‘big data’ and social media together begin to connect information about 
individuals, might be useful for the purposes of crime investigation. However, image recognition technology can 
be countered by use of prosthetic make-up, for example in some high-profile crimes such as armed robberies 
where criminals have taken steps to avoid being recognisable on CCTV.
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Hyper-connectivity and the speed of information processing will mean that the authorities could find it more 
difficult to keep control over data and operations. For example, opportunities to detect crime in progress may 
be reduced as the time to complete transactions is reduced, meaning identity fraudsters only need to maintain 
credibility for a very short period of time.
‘Open source’ intelligence gathering will become a crucial part of crime investigation and prevention, but the 
amount of data online will far exceed the ability of the authorities to analyse it. Finding the relevant information 
will become more challenging, and the risk of missing something important is also comparatively higher. 
Moreover, some organisations may lack the technical skills and IT systems which would enable them to make 
best use of the data available. Consequently, the availability of the appropriate skills and investment in data 
gathering and analysis will become critical to making best use of these opportunities.
Over the next 10 years, themes such as social plurality, facilitated by hyper-connectivity, may lead to more 
social protests. Such protests will likely use new technologies to organise and communicate in real time from 
mobile devices. The response of the police will need to be nuanced and based on a clear understanding of the 
issues and alliances in each specific situation. Policy makers should therefore consider carefully how to mitigate 
the potential impact of perceived Black or Muslim alienation204 and ensure policies such as ‘stop and search’ are 
applied fairly to all, and are perceived as such, in this more fluid context.
Criminal	justice
The foundation of English law is a liberal society, where social identity is, as far as possible, a personally defined 
and freely chosen individual possession. The rights and duties of ‘British citizenship’, may be defined by the state, 
but otherwise an individual is considered the rightful author of their identity. However, there are trends which 
potentially impinge on this principle and how it is understood in practice, ranging from new technologies to 
surveillance techniques and the use of personal data. The challenge for the criminal justice system is, therefore,  
to ensure the autonomy and security of personal, social, and online identities in the future. For example, the law 
could consider an individual’s rights to their digital identities, especially after death, when their archived digital 
inheritance could become open to control by others, and potentially taken over in order to create fake identities 
to facilitate crime.
Surveillance is a key area where tensions can arise between the interests of crime prevention and law 
enforcement, and protecting privacy and individual liberty. Surveillance may be experienced very differently  
by different parts of a society, depending on class, ethnicity, religion, gender, or sexual orientation. For less 
powerful or marginalised communities, surveillance can increase fear and anxiety, undermining social integration 
as individuals feel unfairly targeted by group profiling. The use of surveillance technologies should be developed 
in ways that do not restrict freedom of speech or legitimate forms of behaviour which fall outside what might  
be considered normal. 
Over the next decade, violations of identity and privacy in the online environment are likely to become an 
area for greater public concern; for example, the unauthorised publication of what a participant had assumed 
was private sexual activity could become more frequent2. There may also be an increasing frequency of online 
identities being taken over by others for inappropriate ‘virtual’ acts, which some people consider analogous 
with similar abuse in the physical world2. It is likely that governments will be increasingly embroiled in the 
legal consequences of online identity and how transgressions are policed. It is also possible that there will be 
emerging issues over human versus machine agency, bringing into question issues of responsibility and ownership 
in relation to the use and potential abuse of identity.
594. Challenges and opportunities
There will continue to be a need for the legal system to seek to balance the rights of individuals to liberty and 
freedom of expression (both online and offline), while protecting their privacy and their data. Law enforcement 
now occurs within a globalised environment, where legal jurisdiction can create limitations. It will be increasingly 
challenging to keep up with the pace of change in new technology and the myriad ways in which it interacts with 
people’s identities and behaviours. For example, those drafting laws should expect that legal definitions relating 
to identity theft and property may be quickly outdated in view of the speed of evolution of new technologies, 
online platforms, and the transnational nature of the internet. There will also be a need for careful management 
of public expectations, greater public awareness of rights and responsibilities, and appropriate training for 
criminal justice agencies including the police, prosecution, courts, and the legal profession. 
4.3 Conclusion
Over the next decade, identities in the UK are likely to undergo important changes, and will be increasingly 
dynamic or volatile. Simple categorisations based on traditional notions of identities are likely to become less 
meaningful. This will affect society and influence the way that people live their lives. In future, the UK needs to be 
considered as much a part of the virtual world as a real place. Increasingly, its citizens will be globally networked, 
hyper-connected individuals, and this has substantial implications for what is meant by communities and by 
social integration. 
The increasing speed and connectivity of information technology systems offers opportunities for monitoring 
what is happening in real time, and assessing the effectiveness of specific policies. For policy makers, understanding 
the changing nature of identity in the UK will be increasingly important for effective policy making and 
implementation. Failure to do so may lead to missed opportunities to, for example, strengthen social integration, 
reduce exclusion, enhance open policy making, and make effective use of identities as a resource. Government 
would also benefit from drawing upon a deeper scientific understanding of people’s evolving identities when 
developing, implementing and testing policies, for example in initiatives such as ‘Test, Learn, Adapt’. Policy making 
across many different areas will need to be more iterative, adaptive, nuanced and agile, taking into consideration 
the multifaceted nature of people’s identities and how policies might affect different groups, or individuals, at 
different times and places. 
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